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Slaying the Nuclear Giants: Is California's
New Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legislation
Shielded Against the Attack
of Federal Preemption?
Indeed, there is no better subject with which to scare people than
nuclear energy. What is new, what is not completely understood, is
always frightening. But nuclear energy is a special case. It comes
from a remote part of research that, in the minds of many people,
borders on science fiction. It was developed in wartime and
shrouded in secrecy. It came to the attention of mankind when, in
two strokes, more than 100,000 people were killed in the final days
of a terrible war...
Edward Teller'
1976 was a year in which a number of states took steps to exercise some
control over the use of thermal nuclear power within their jurisdictions. The
November ballots in six states contained a variety of proposals that would
have limited nuclear development by requiring stringent safety measures
governing its use.2 Although these initiative measures were soundly de-
feated, 3 they do represent a growing concern by some states for the need to
exercise greater control over nuclear power development. By October 1976,
1. Teller, Nuclear Salvation, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1976, at 15.
2. Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, Ohio, and Washington each considered initia-
tives that would have restricted the development of nuclear power within their respective
states. [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) no. 27, at 986.
3. The percentages of votes cast against these measures were: Arizona, 70%; Colorado,
70.9%; Montana, 58.1%; Oregon, 58%; Ohio, 68%; and Washington, 67.4%. Id.
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state legislatures had enacted 49 new laws regulating the nuclear industry-
nearly a one-third increase over similarly enacted legislation in 1975. 4
Although most of these new laws dealt with reorganization of state energy
policy and program activities, 5 legislatures in 14 states debated 25 bills that
were described by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [hereinafter referred
to as the NRC] as imposing a limitation or a moratorium on the development
of nuclear power. 6 California was the only one of these states to pass such
restrictive legislation.7 Responding to the controversy raised by the June
1976 nuclear safeguards initiative, 8 the California Legislature enacted new
thermal nuclear power plant siting legislation that places certain conditions
upon the land use for, and certification of, nuclear power plants in the state. 9
Critics of the new siting legislation believe that the conditions imposed by
the new laws overlap an area of nuclear power plant regulation which has
arguably been reserved by the federal government. 10 Proponents, on the
other hand, argue that the California laws are merely an exercise of land use
4. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.168, at A-21.
5. Id. at A-21 - A-22. However, a number of states enacted measures dealing in some
form with issues of waste disposal and the transportation of nuclear materials. Kentucky
enacted legislation requiring a study of the effects of radioactive waste disposal in that state.
Kentucky also enacted a law increasing the per pound charge for disposal of waste materials.
Tennessee and Virginia enacted legislation requiring the bonding of nuclear facilities and the
establishment of perpetual care trust funds. Louisiana enacted a resolution authorizing a joint
legislative committee to undertake an indepth study of the feasibility and ramifications of
underground salt dome storage, and Hawaii passed two bills calling for the abandonment by the
federal government of any plans to dispose of nuclear wastes in the oceans. Since Georgia is the
site of the massive Savannah River nuclear complex and the Barnwell nuclear fuel reprocessing
facility, that state undertook to restructure its state radiation control act by designating the state
division of environmental protection as the agency to issue permits for construction and
operation of facilities for the "construction, storage, or burial of radioactive wastes." Four
states enacted laws relating to the transportation of radioactive substances. Connecticut legisla-
tion was enacted to prohibit the transportation of radioactive materials into or through the state
without a certificate of transport from the Commissioner of Transportation and a new amend-
ment to the New York City Health Code prohibits the transport of nuclear materials through
that city except in cases of emergency. Id.
6. Id. at A-22.
7. In 1975, the Vermont legislature enacted a law which prohibits the location of nuclear
powered electric generating plants within the state without the approval of the state's general
assembly. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §248(c) (Supp. 1976).
8. In June 1976, California voters were asked to consider a proposal that would have
placed limitations on the development and operation of nuclear power plants. Briefly, the
initiative would have required by June 1977, that all liability limitations relating to nuclear
power plants be removed by law or specific waiver. If such limits were not removed by June
1977, all nuclear power plants in the state would have been required to operate at no more than
60 percent of their licensed capacity. If liability limits had not been removed by 1981, operating
levels of power plants would have been cut an additional ten percent of their original licensed
power level each year thereafter. Furthermore, the state legislature would have been required
to make certain determinations respecting reactor safety systems and waste disposal tech-
nologies. A failure to make affirmative findings would have precluded new power plant
construction and resulted in a phase-out of existing power plants. For a discussion of the issues
contained in the California initiative, see 7 CAL. J. (Ballot Prop. Analysis) 6-7 (1976); THE
CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR INITIATIVE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES (Stan. U. Inst. for
Energy Studies 1976).
9. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 194, §1, at ; CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §25524.2, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 196, §1, at ; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§25524.3, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 195, §1, at . See generally REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 8 PAC. L.J. 338 (1977) (nuclear safety).
10. For a discussion of the legal framework surrounding the issue of federal preemption
of the field of atomic energy, see text accompanying notes 140-205 infra.
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control that has been left expressly to the states." Regardless of how these
new siting provisions are characterized, they will be watched closely by
other states since their successful application in California could pave the
way for similar measures elsewhere.
The existence of a comprehensive body of federal statutory law justifies
an inquiry into whether the Congress has intended to exclude state activity in
the occupied field. 12 The private development of nuclear power can trace its
lineage to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; 13 this federal regulation logically
raises the spectre of preemption in the field of atomic energy. This comment
will analyze the new California siting laws and discuss whether, against a
federal preemption attack, the provisions of the legislation will survive as a
permissible exercise of state regulatory authority over atomic energy. The
provisions of the siting laws will be outlined and their probable effect on
nuclear power development in the state will be explored. There will also be
a discussion of recent developments in federal case law that relate to nuclear
fuel reprocessing and waste disposal-areas of consideration that are cov-
ered by the new siting laws. The comment will then focus on the parameters
of permissible state regulation of nuclear power and will scrutinize carefully
the new California laws to determine whether they operate within acceptable
bounds of state regulatory authority.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT SITING LEGISLATION
In 1975, the legislature created a comprehensive energy facility siting
scheme which empowered the State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission [hereinafter referred to as the ERCDC, or the
Energy Commission] to certify sites to be used for thermal nuclear power
plants and related facilities. 4 The ERCDC is required to consider in its
siting decisions, among other things, the safety and reliability of any
proposed power plant15 and whether or not the proposed facility conforms to
I1. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,53 (1941); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52,56
(1915). For a discussion of permissible state regulatory authority in the field of atomic energy,
see text accompanying notes 206-261 infra.
12. Generally, the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme and the dominance of
the federal interest in the regulated field have led the Supreme Court of the United States to
question whether there is an intent by the Congress to preempt state regulation in the occupied
field. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§2011-2296 (1970).
14. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25500-25542. See generally REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 6 PAC. L.J. 329 (1975) (energy conservation).
15. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25511 reads:
The commission shall review the factors related to safety and reliability of the
facilities at each of the alternative sites designated in the notice. In addition to other
information requested of the applicant, the commission shall, in determining the
appropriateness of sites and related facilities, require detailed information on pro-
posed emergency systems and safety precautions, plans for transport, handling and
storage of wastes and fuels, proposed methods to prevent illegal diversion of nuclear
fuels, special design features to account for seismic and other potential hazards,
proposed methods to control density of population in areas surrounding nuclear
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a ten-year forecast of statewide and service area electric power demand. 16
Sections 25524.1, 25524.2, and 25524.3 have been added to the siting
provisions of the Public Resources Code and establish additional considera-
tions and conditions to the siting and certification of thermal nuclear power
plants. 17
Section 25524.3 requires the ERCDC to submit to the legislature, by
January 1, 1978, a study of the necessity, effectiveness, and economic
feasibility of the underground siting and berm containment of nuclear power
plants. 1 8 The study must evaluate these siting concepts in light of the public
health and safety requirements of Public Resources Code Sections 25511
and 25520.19 If, as a result of the study, the Energy Commission adopts
powerplants, and such other information as the commission may determine to be
relevant to the reliability and safety of the facility at the proposed sites. The commis-
sion shall analyze the information provided by the applicant, supplementing it, where
necessary, by onsite investigations and other studies. The commission shall deter-
mine the adequacy of measures proposed by the applicant to protect public health
and safety, and shall include its findings in the preliminary report required by Section
25510.
16. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25309 provides in pertinent part:
Beginning January 1, 1977, and every two years thereafter, the commission shall
transmit to the Governor and the Legislature a comprehensive report designed to
identify emerging trends related to energy supply, demand, and conservation and
public health and safety factors, to specify the level of statewide and service area
electrical energy demand for each year in the forthcoming 5-, 10-, and 20-year
periods, and to provide the basis for state policy and actions in relation thereto,
including, but not limited to, approval of new sites for additional facilities.
17. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25524.1, 25524.2, 25524.3 [hereinafter all references to code
sections will be to the California Public Resources Code unless otherwise specified]. The
California provisions for certification of nuclear power plants are set out at note 36 infra.
18. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3(a). Berm containment is the surrounding of nuclear
power plants by large earthen mounds. For a discussion of underground siting methods, see
Crowly, Doan, & McCreath, Underground Nuclear Plant Siting: A Technical and Safety
Assessment, 15 NUCLEAR SAFETY 519 (1974).
19. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3. For the text of Section 25511, see note 15 supra. CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §25520 reads:
The application shall contain the following and such other information as the commis-
sion by regulation may require:
(a) A detailed description of the design, construction, and operation of the proposed
facility.(b) Safety and reliability information, including, in addition to documentation previ-
ously provided pursuant to Section 25511, planned provisions for emergency opera-
tions and shutdowns.(c) Available site information, including maps and descriptions of present and pro-
posed development and, as appropriate, geological, aesthetic, ecological, seismic,
water supply, population and load center data, and justification for the particular site
proposed.(d) Such other information relating to the design, operation, and siting of the facility
as the commission may specify.(e) A statement of need providing information showing compatibility of the proposed
facility with the most recent biennial report issued by the commission pursuant to
Section 25309.(f) A description of the facility, the cost of the facility, the fuel to be used, the source
of fuel, fuel cost, plant service life and capacity factor, and generating cost per
kilowatt hour.(g) A description of any electric transmission lines including the estimated cost of the
proposed electric transmission line; a map in suitable scale of the proposed routing
showing details of the rights-of-way in the vicinity of settled areas, parks, recreation-
al areas, and scenic areas, and existing transmission lines within one mile of the
proposed route; and justification for the route and a preliminary description of the
effect of the proposed electric transmission line on the environment, ecology, and
scenic, historic and recreational values.
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regulations implementing its findings, those regulations will be suspended
for one year to allow the legislature to evaluate and verify the study.
However, if the ERCDC rejects undergrounding and berm containment, a
one-year moratorium will be imposed on new Energy Commission plant
approvals to allow the legislature to consider further statutory changes.2 °
Until the provisions of Section 25524.3 are satisfied, no new thermal
nuclear power plants will be granted land use within the state and the
ERCDC may not certify new plant construction.
21
Sections 25524.1 and 25524.2 establish further conditions to the siting
and certification of new nuclear power facilities. Section 25524.1, which
applies to nuclear power plants that require the reprocessing of fuel rods,
precludes land use for, or certification of, such power plants unless the
ERCDC makes a finding that the proper United States agency has "iden-
tified and approved" an existing technology for nuclear fuel reprocessing
and the Energy Commission has reported such findings to the legislature. 22
Section 25524.2 requires a similar finding and reporting that there exists an
approved, permanent and terminal method of disposing of high-level nuc-
lear wastes. 23 Once the findings required by these two sections are made, the
ERCDC may proceed to certify nuclear power plants under these provisions
only if the findings are not rejected by a majority vote of either house during
the following 100 working days of the legislature. 24 An additional require-
ment imposed by Section 25524.1 is that, prior to certifying a new power
plant, the ERCDC must make a finding that there will exist, at the time of
operation, adequate reprocessing capacity or federally approved storage
capacity to handle that reactor's spent fuel elements.25 Each of these new
sections contains a "grandfather clause" exempting certain planned and
existing power plants,26 and also contains a provision whereby certain
20. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3(b), (c).
21. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3.
22. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1. Reprocessing is that portion of the nuclear fuel cycle
in which reusable portions of spent fuel are separated and reenriched for use as reactor fuel.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547
F.2d 633, 637 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, see text
accompanying notes 39-70 infra.
23. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.2. Waste disposal refers to the storage and management
of toxic nuclear wastes produced by the fission reaction in the normal operation of nuclear
power plants. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 637 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For a discussion of high-level nuclear waste
disposal, see text accompanying notes 77-91 infra.
24. A disaffirming resolution must set forth reasons for rejecting the ERCDC findings
and, when feasible, provide guidelines by which the Energy Commission may bring its findings
into conformance with the requirements of the respective sections. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§25524. 1(a)(2), 25524.2(b).
25. Power plants with federally approved storage capacity must maintain reserve storage
space at the plant site to handle the reactors full complement of core fuel elements at any time.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(b).
26. There are presently three operational nuclear power plants in California. Pacific Gas
and Electric Company has a boiling water reactor with a 63MW capacity located at Humbolt
Bay near Eureka. Southern California Edison Company is currently operating San Onofre No. 1
near San Clemente, a pressurized water reactor with an installed capacity of 430MW. A third
operational power plant, located near Sacramento, is operated by the Sacramento Municipal
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power facilities may acquire vested rights excluding them from the require-
ments of the new siting laws.
27
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW SITING LEGISLATION
Under the new siting legislation, unless the conditions imposed by each of
the new sections are satisfied, with limited exceptions, 28 no new thermal
nuclear power plant will be permitted land use in this state and the ERCDC
will be prevented from certifying new plant construction. 29 Collectively, the
new laws have the potential effect of slowing the growth rate of nuclear
power in California, since a failure to satisfy any one of the new provisions
could prevent new nuclear power plant construction.
It has been estimated that as many as 34 nuclear power plants will be
required by 1995 to meet the state's projected energy needs. 30 Thus, if the
new siting provisions were to restrict the growth of new plant construction,
the effect could be to impede the ability of public utilities to satisfy future
energy demands in California. However, seven existing or partially con-
Utility District and is a pressurized water reactor with an installed capacity of 916MW.
Mitchell, Nuclear Survey: Cancellations and Delays, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Oct. 15, 1975, at 40,
42 [hereinafter cited as Nuclear Survey]. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25524.1, 25524.2, 25524.3
exempt the following nuclear facilities that are near completion:(1) As designated in the report of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted to
the Public Utilities Commission on December 23, 1966, pursuant to Section 1001 of
the Public Utilities Code, one nuclear thermal powerplant, having a generating
capacity of 1,060 megawatts, commonly known as Diablo Canyon Unit 1, to be
located in San Luis Obispo County.
(2) As designated in the report of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted to
the Public Utilities Commission on February 16, 1968, pursuant to Section 1001 of the
Public Utilities Code, one nuclear thermal powerplant, having a generating capacity
of 1,060 megawatts, commonly known As Diablo Canyon Unit 2, to be located in San
Luis Obispo County.
(3) As designated in the report of the Southern California Edison Company and the
San Diego Gas and Electric Company to the Public Utilities Commission on July 16,
1970, pursuant to Section 1001 of the Public Utilities Code, two nuclear thermal
powerplants, having a generating capacity of 1,100 megawatts per unit, commonly
known as San Onofre Unit 2 and San Onofre Unit 3, to be located in San Diego
County.
27. If an electric utility has undertaken prior to January 1, 1977, substantial construction
and incurred substantial expenses for construction or necessary materials to build a power
plant, it will have acquired vested rights exempting it from the requirements of the new siting
sections. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25524.1(c), 25524.2(e), 25524.3(c). Section 25524.3 does not
apply to:
any nuclear fission thermal powerplant site and related facility for which a notice of
intent has been filed pursuant to Section 25502 with, and accepted by, the commis-
sion within three years of the effective date of this act.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3(c). The two proposed facilities most likely to be affected by the
vested rights provisions of the new siting legislation will be the San Diego Gas and Electric, Sun
Desert plant, and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, San Joaquin Nuclear
Project. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.147, at A-28. For a discussion of the vested rights
provisions of the new siting legislation, see REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLA-
TION, 8 PAC. L.J. 338 (1977) (nuclear safety).
28. Both §25524.2 and §25524.3 apply to all types of nuclear power plants. Section 25524.1
only applies to power plants that require the reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §25524.1(a). For a discussion of nuclear power plants that require the reprocessing of
nuclear fuel rods, see text accompanying notes 45-52 infra.
29. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25524.1(a), 25524.2, 25524.3.
30. The estimate of the need for 34 power plants by 1995 is based on data submitted by
California utilities. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, LAND USE, AND ENERGY.
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE: A STAFF BACKGROUND ANALYSIS 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE].
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structed facilities are not affected by the new legislation and two planned
nuclear units may have acquired vested rights under the law. 31
To understand fully the effects of the new siting laws, the selective impact
of each of the provisions must be discussed. If, after completing a study of
undergrounding and berm containment, the ERCDC makes affirmative
findings concerning reprocessing and waste disposal technologies, and the
legislature concurs in those findings, the new laws will have a negligible
impact on new plant construction. On the other hand, either negative
findings by the Energy Commission or a disaffirming resolution by the
legislature could prevent nuclear plant construction indefinitely. The focus
of this section will be on the likelihood of satisfying the conditions imposed
by these new siting provisions so that new nuclear power plant construction
may resume.
A. Study of Undergrounding and Berm Containment
It appears unlikely that the conditions imposed by Section 25524.3 will
have a significant impact on the development of nuclear power in the state.
The only requirement imposed by this section is that the ERCDC undertake
to study the "necessity, effectiveness, and economic feasibility of the
undergrounding and berm containment of nuclear reactors. ' '3 2 The study
must be submitted to the legislature by January 1, 1978, and if the ERCDC
adopts regulations implementing its findings, those regulations will be
suspended for one year to allow for legislative review. If, after the study is
completed, no such regulations are imposed, there will be a one-year
moratorium on new power plant approvals to allow the legislature to con-
sider further legislation relating to undergrounding and berm containment.33
The requirement of a study will probably delay new plant construction for
only one year, but it could conceivably delay such construction for a longer
period.34 However, since this section does not affect the filing of notices of
intention 35 and applications for certification 36 pending compliance with the
31. See notes 26 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
32. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3(a).
33. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §25524.3(b), (c).
34. It is conceivable that the one year moratorium imposed by §25524.3(c) could be
extended while the legislature debates legislation relating to the undergrounding and berm
containment of reactors. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3(c).
35. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25502 provides:
Each person proposing to construct a thermal powerplant or electric transmission line
on a site shall submit to the commission notice of intention to file an application for
the certification of such site and related facility or facilities. The notice shall be an
attempt primarily to determine the suitability of the proposed sites to accommodate
the facilities and to determine the general conformity of the proposed sites and
related facilities with standard of the commission and forecasts adopted pursuant to
Sections 25216.3 and 25309. The notice shall be in the form prescribed by the
commission and shall be supported by such information as the commission may
require.
Any site and related facility once found to be acceptable pursuant to Section 25516
is, and shall continue to be, eligible for consideration in an application for certifica-
tion without further proceedings required for a notice under this chapter.
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See generally REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 6 PAC. Li. 329 (1975)
(energy conservation).
36. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25519 reads:
(a) In order to obtain certification for a site and related facility, an application for
certification of such site and related facility shall be filed with the commission. Such
application shall be in a form prescribed by the commission and shall be filed with the
commission no later than 18 months before any construction is to commence. Such
application shall be for a site and related facility which has been found to be
acceptable by the commission pursuant to Section 25516, or for an additional facility
at a site which has been designated a potential multiple-facility site pursuant to
Section 25514.5 and found to be acceptable pursuant to Sections 25516 and 25516.5.
An application for an additional facility at a potential multiple-facility site shall be
subject to the conditions and review specified in Section 25520.5. An application may
not be filed for a site and related facility, if there is no suitable alternative for the site
and related facility which was previously found to be acceptable by the commission,
unless the commission has approved the notice based on the one site as specified in
Section 25516.
(b) The commission, upon its own motion or in response to the request of any party,
may require the applicant to submit any information, document, or data, in addition
to the attachments required by subdivision (i), which it determines is reasonably
necessary to make any decision on the application.
(c) Upon receipt of the application, the commission shall undertake studies and
investigations necessary to comply with the environmental impact reporting proce-
dures established pursuant to Section 21100. For purposes of preparation and approv-
al of the environmental impact report on a proposed site and related facility, the
commission shall be the lead agency as provided in Section 21165, except as to any
site and related facility proposed to be located within the permit area if a permit from
the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission is required. Except as other-
wise provided in Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000), the environmental
impact report shall be completed within one year after receipt of the application.
(d) If the site and related facility specified in the application is proposed to be located
in the coastal zone and a permit is required from the California Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission, the commission shall transmit a copy of the application to
the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission for its review and comments.
(e) Upon receipt of an application, the commission shall forward the application to
local governmental agencies having land use and related jurisdiction in the area of the
proposed site and related facility. Such local agencies shall review the application and
submit comments on, among other things, the design of facility, architectural and
aesthetic features of the facility, access to highways, landscaping and grading, public
use of lands in the area of the facility, and other appropriate aspects of the design,
construction, or operation of the proposed site and related facility.
(f) Upon receipt of an application, the commission shall cause a summary of the
application to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in
which the site and related facilities, or any part thereof, designated in the application,
is proposed to be located. The commission shall transmit a copy of the application to
each federal and state agency having jurisdiction or special interest in matters
pertinent to the proposed site and related facilities, and to the Attorney General.
(g) The adviser shall require that adequate notice is given to the public and that the
procedures specified by this division are complied with.
(h) For any proposed site and related facility requiring a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, the commission shall transmit a copy of the application to the
Public Utilities Commission and request the comments and recommendations of the
Public Utilities Commission on the economic, financial, rate, system reliability, and
service implications of the proposed site and related facility. In the event the commis-
sion requires modification of the proposed facility, the commission shall consult with
the Public Utilities Commission regarding the economic, financial, rate, system
reliability, and service implications of such modifications.
(i) The commission shall transmit a copy of the application to any governmental
agency not specifically mentioned in this act, but which it finds has any information
or interest in the proposed site and related facilities, and shall invite the comments
and recommendations of each such agency. The commission shall request any relev-
ant laws, ordinances, or regulations which any such agency has promulgated or
administered.
(j) An application for certification of any site and related facilities shall contain a
listing of every federal agency from which any approval or authorization concerning
the proposed site is required, specifying the approvals or authorizations obtained at
the time of the application and the schedule for obtaining any approvals or authoriza-
tions pending.
See generally REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 6 PAC. L.J. 329 (1975)
(energy conservation).
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study provision,3 7 its impact on actual start-up dates for new nuclear power
plants will be minimal.38 Thus, it appears that Section 25524.3, which
requires a study concerning undergrounding and berm containment of reac-
tors, should not significantly delay any new nuclear power plant
construction.
B. Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Nuclear fuel reprocessing is that portion of the nuclear fuel cycle39 which
recaptures unused uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and
converts these elements into usable reactor fuel.n Section 25524.1 prevents
new thermal nuclear power plants requiring the reprocessing of spent fuel41
from being permitted land use within the state, or from being granted
certification by the ERCDC until that commission has made a finding that
the appropriate United States agency42 has identified and approved an
existing technology for the construction and operation of nuclear fuel repro-
cessing plants. 43 This new section also requires a determination by the
ERCDC on a case-by-case basis that for each new power plant there will
exist adequate capacity either to reprocess or store that reactor's spent fuel,
37. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3(c).
38. It takes approximately three years to comply with the site certification provisions
embodied in §25500 et seq. By the time that any plant not exempted from the new laws has
complied with the state certification procedures, the undergrounding and berm containment
study should be completed. Studer, Effect of State Bills to Control Nuclear Development
Probed, L.A. Daily J., July 20, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
39. During the normal operation of a nuclear power plant, fission products and by-
products build up in the reactor, thereby reducing the efficiency of the fission reaction. About
one-third of the fuel assemblies must be removed from the reactor core each year and replaced
with new fuel. Spent fuel normally would be reprocessed to extract unused uranium-235 and
potentially usable plutonium-239. T. LASH, J. BRYSON, & R. COTTON, CITIZEN'S GUIDE: THE
NATIONAL DEBATE ON THE HANDLING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
6-7 (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CITIZEN'S GUIDE].
Under this theoretical closed fuel cycle, recovered uranium is reenriched and refabricated into
usable fuel. Plutonium, which is produced as a source by-product, is also fabricated into fuel
elements that are returned to the reactor. Hearings on Proposition 15 the Nuclear Initiative
Before the California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, Nov. 4,
1975, Vol. VII, at 174 (reprinted testimony of A.E. Schubert given before the Subcommittee on
Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs)
[hereinafter cited as testimony of A.E. Schubert].
40. Fissionable plutonium isotopes can be used to fuel nuclear power plants as a substi-
tute for uranium-235. Research and development on the use of plutonium-bearing fuels has
been conducted over the past 25 years, and it has been suggested that plutonium fuels will play
an important role as a nuclear fuel source after 1980. Hearings on Proposition 15 the Nuclear
Initiative Before the California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and
Energy, Nov. 19, 1975, vol. X, at 368 (testimony of E.R. Johnson) [hereinafter cited as
testimony of E.R. Johnson]. Reprocessing has been defined by one federal court as "that phase
of the fuel cycle in which reusable portions of spent fuel are extracted for recycling and the
remaining radioactive residues are concentrated." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 647 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For a
discussion of reprocessing and a description of the nuclear fuel cycle see Mason, Overall View
of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, in EDUCATION AND RESEARCH IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 3 (D.M.
Elliot ed. 1972).
41. For a discussion of the distinction afforded power plants "requiring the reprocessing
of fuel rods," see text accompanying notes 45-52 infra.
42. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the agency presently responsible for approv-
ing both reprocessing facilities and nuclear waste disposal technologies. See 42 U.S.C. §§5842,
5844(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
43. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(1).
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and that such capacity is or will be available at the time such units will
require the reprocessing or storing of its fuel.'
Section 25524.1 applies only to those nuclear power plants "requiring the
reprocessing of fuel rods," 45 but does not define what types of plants are
included. Most power plants in the United States are light-water reactors 46
and the fuel cycle of these reactors theoretically includes nuclear fuel
reprocessing. 47 Technically, a breeder reactor would not require nuclear fuel
reprocessing since it creates more fuel than it consumes 48 and therefore this
type of reactor probably would not be covered by this section of the new
siting laws. There are currently no operational breeder reactors in this
country, however, and the California nuclear power industry has been
dependent upon the light-water reactor. 49 Light-water reactors do not re-
quire nuclear fuel reprocessing to generate electricity, but reprocessing is
essential if they are to operate economically. 50 The alternative to reproces-
sing is either the storage of spent fuel rods as they come out of the reactor,
51
or the use of less conventional, but considerably more expensive, fuel. 52
Both economic and health and safety considerations are involved in the
reprocessing and storage decision. Because of the developing shortage of
available uranium supplies, it is considered economically imperative that the
fuel cycle be completed with reprocessing. 53 Furthermore, there is an
44. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(2) (b).
45. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(1).
46. See Nuclear Survey, supra note 26, at 38-44.
47. See testimony of A.E. Schubert, supra note 39.
48. Testimony of E.R. Johnson, supra note 40, at 370. However, since plutonium is not a
naturally existing element and is a source by-product of the fission reaction, its availability
depends in part on the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The federal Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration has noted:
Program delays have postponed the time when the breeder will remove the con-
straints of uranium resources and separative work [i.e. fuel enrichment] on nuclear
growth. Further, the breeder system requires that reprocessing of fuel and recycle of
plutonium be licensed and demonstrated.
U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE: A REPORT
BY THE FUEL CYCLE TASK FORCE v (1975) (ERDA-33) [hereinafter cited as ERDA-33].
President Carter has recently announced plans to forgo the development of a breeder reactor
in this country. Sacramento Bee, March 26, 1977, at A18, col. 1. On April 20, 1977, President
Carter formally announced the indefinite deferment of the construction of the Clinch River
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Project. It was announced that the United
States breeder program would be redirected toward the evaluation of alternative breeders,
fuels, and advanced converter reactors. Furthermore, the President added that uranium enrich-
ment services would be expanded, and such capacity would be directed toward the new
centrifuge enrichment technology and away from gaseous diffusion plants. 13 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Doc. 581 (April 25, 1977).
49. See Nuclear Survey, supra note 26, at 40, 42.
50. See text accompanying notes 53-61 infra.
51. The alternative to reprocessing is interim storage of spent fuel followed by permanent
disposal of the entire fuel element after it has been pulled from the reactor core. Colby, Fuel
Reprocessing in the United States: A Review of Problems and Some Solutions, NUCLEAR NEWS,
June 1976, at 72 [hereinafter cited as Colby]. For a brief analysis of the throwaway alternative,
see [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.171, at A-22.
52. See Taylor & Lee, Closing a Gap to Cost SMUD $2 Million, Sacramento Union, Nov.
30, 1975, at A4, col. 9.
53. Late in 1973, uranium prices began to rise sharply-by as much as 105 percent in a
single year. J. HARDING, THE DEFLATION OF RANCHO SECo 2 7 (Friends of the Earth Foundation
1975). Known or projected uranium supplies are insufficient to support the projected growth in
light-water reactors beyond 1995. Hearings on Proposition 15 the Nuclear Initiative Before the
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increased risk that radioactive materials may be released into the environ-
ment as a result of on-site storage-rather than reprocessing-of spent
nuclear fuel.54 The status of reprocessing in the United States is unsettled
and there are currently no reprocessing plants in operation in this country. 55
Although some reprocessing plants have been constructed, they are not
receiving any spent fuel, and according to a recent report released by the
federal Energy Research and Development Administration:
It is improbable that industry on its own will be able to carry
through with commercialization of the 'backend' of the fuel cycle.
Some aspects of reprocessing have not been demonstrated com-
mercially, fabrication of plutonium-bearing fuel has not been de-
monstrated on a full-scale production basis, [and] the economic
attractiveness of the plutonium re-cycle has not been proven
56
The severity of the reprocessing problem becomes clear when it is learned
that by 1982 the spent fuel from the nation's nuclear power plants will
exceed even the currently planned reprocessing capacity 57 and the lead time
California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, Dec. 10, 1975, vol.
XV, at 126 (testimony of Barry Commoner) [hereinafter cited as testimony of Barry
Commoner]. One nuclear fuel supplier has announced that it considers itself legally excused
from performance of its long-term fuel commitments because of the uranium shortage. Taylor
& Lee, SMUD in a Bind as Uranium Prices Soar, Sacramento Union, Nov. 27, 1975, at A3, col.
1. For a discussion of the uranium supply situation, see Lapp, We May Find Ourselves Short of
Uranium, Too, FORTUNE, Oct. 1975, at 151; McClary & Primack, BreederReactors, the Biggest
Nuclear Gamble, SIERRA CLUB BUL., March 1977, at 14. A recently published study by the
Energy Research and Development Administration has revealed that the recycle of plutonium
and uranium would provide an additional 30 percent of present electrical generating capacity by
the year 2000. [1977] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) (Last Report Letter) no.78, at 4 (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
54. It is probable that if spent fuel storage facilities are not located within the primary
reactor containment or provided with adequate protective features, radioactive leaks could
result from either a loss of water in the storage pool or mechanical damage to the fuel within the
pool. There has been at least one minor pool storage accident at the Humbolt Bay nuclear
facility in which an irradiated spent fuel assembly fell six feet to the floor of the cooling pond,
tipped over, and fell into the deep fuel pit in the corner of the pool. Hearings on Proposition 15
the Nuclear Initiative Before the California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use,
and Energy, Dec. 9, 1975, vol. XIV, at 100 (testimony of Donna Reed Asmus) [hereinafter cited
as testimony of Donna Reed Asmus].
55. The only reprocessing plant to operate on a commercial basis was Nuclear Fuel
Services located at West Valley, New York. It is presently closed for modifications to increase
capacity, to increase efficiency, and to meet environmental standards. ERDA-33, supra note
48, at 23. General Electric Company has abandoned its plans to operate its plant at Morris,
Illinois. General Electric's plant would have handled the spent fuel from the Rancho Seco
nuclear power plant. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 20, 1975, at B3, col. 1. Allied General Nuclear
Services is currently constructing a reprocessing facility at Barnwell, South Carolina, but this
facility will not be operational until 1978, if then. CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note
30, at 37. For a discussion of the problems plaguing the commercial reprocessing industry see
Colby, supra note 51, at 68; Why Atomic Power Dims Today, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 17, 1975,
at 98.
56. ERDA-33, supra note 48, at iv.
57. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON RESOURCES, LAND USE, AND ENERGY, REAS-
SESSMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 15 AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES 24 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA]. Based on
industry calculations, even if all three facilities were to soon become operational and provided
4750 metric-tons of capacity, nearly 60,000 tons of fuel will have accumulated by 1995. Id. For
future reprocessing demand to be met there must be a new commitment of 1600 metric-ton
capacity immediately and every two years thereafter. CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra
note 30, at 39.
Pacific Law Journal I Vol. 8
required to build new reprocessing plants may be as great as ten years. 58
An additional problem facing the reprocessing industry is that at this
writing a decision had not been made on whether to close the fuel cycle with
reprocessing of spent fuel. On the eve of the November election, President
Ford announced that the United States would not proceed with the reproces-
sing of nuclear fuel because of the dangers associated with the separation of
plutonium. 59 It has been speculated that the environmentally conscious
President Carter Will follow a similar policy with respect to nuclear fuel
reprocessing.6" It is difficult to ascertain precisely what effect the federal
reprocessing decision might have on the new California law, but if the
federal government chooses a throwaway alternative to reprocessing, there
may never be an approved and existing reprocessing technology to satisfy
the provisions of Section 25524.1.61 In such an eventuality, further legisla-
tion may be required to allow new construction of thermal nuclear power
plants which depend on the reprocessing of their fuel, since the conditions
imposed by the new siting law could never be satisfied.
The alternative to a closed fuel cycle is to store spent fuel rods as they
come out of the reactor; 62 this could increase the storage requirements for
spent fuel by a factor of two. 63 Under the new siting law, either reprocessing
capacity or federally approved storage space must be available at the time
power plants will require the reprocessing or storing of their spent fuel. 64
Nationwide, there is a predicted shortage of available storage capacity for
spent fuel, and it has been estimated that as many as ten reactors may be
58. NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 57, at 24.
59. [1976] 2 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,043. President Ford stated:
I have decided that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used
nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear
fuel cycle, and that we should pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future only if
they are found to be consistent with our international objectives.
Speech by President Gerald Ford, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1626 (Nov. 1, 1976).
60. See [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.169, at A-24. On April 7, 1977, President Carter
announced a major change in domestic nuclear energy policy which included, among other
things, the indefinite deferment of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium pro-
duced by the United States' nuclear power programs. The President noted that "a viable and
adequate economic nuclear program can be maintained without such reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium. The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina for instance, will receive neither Federal
encouragement nor funding from us for its completion as a reprocessing facility." 13 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 503 (April 11, 1977).
61. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1. For a discussion of the throwaway fuel cycle, see
note 51 supra and accompanying text. Fearing the obvious impact of President Carter's
decision on reprocessing and recycling of plutonium on California's siting law, one California
State Assemblyman has introduced a measure to repeal §25524.1. AB 1852, 1977 Regular
Session.
62. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
63. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.171, at A-23.
64. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(b) reads:
The commission shall further find on a case-by-case basis that facilities with ade-
quate capacity to reprocess nuclear fuel rods from a certified nuclear facility or to
store such fuel if such storage is approved by an authorized agency of the United
States are in actual operation or will be in operation at the time such nuclear facility
requires such reprocessing or storage; provided, however, that such storage of fuel is
in an offsite location to the extent necessary to provide continuous onsite full core
reserve storage capacity.
1977 / Nuclear Power Siting
forced to shut down within the next two years as a result of inadequate
storage space.65 Many reactors are using storage space that is supposed to
remain available for emergency handling of the reactor's current fuel load to
accomodate spent fuel rods. 66 The three operating nuclear power plants in
California have been running out of adequate space for safe storage of their
spent fuel.67 The Sacramento Municipal Utility District's Rancho Seco No.
1 facility, for example, has been forced to expand its onsite storage capacity
by purchasing additional storage racks, 68 and the Southern California Edi-
son, San Onofre No. 1 unit and the Pacific Gas and Electric nuclear power
plant at Humbolt Bay have been exploring methods of stretching fuel use
from one year to eighteen months before changing fuel elements.6 9 Since the
new California law requires that there be storage capacity available to
handle reactor spent fuel as plants become operational" a nationwide shor-
tage of storage space could prevent the operation of new power plants in this
state.
Summarizing the issues relating to reprocessing, there are presently no
operational reprocessing plants in the United States, and under a closed-
cycle policy it could be more than a decade before there would be sufficient
reprocessing capacity to handle the spent fuel from existing power plants. If
the federal government permanently abandons the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel, the effect on California nuclear power is uncertain. There is
also a developing shortage of storage capacity that could prevent new
thermal nuclear power plants from becoming operational under Section
25524.1. It is difficult to predict accurately the precise impact of the
reprocessing provisions of the new California siting legislation, but the
prognosis for immediate resumption of nuclear plant construction is not
good.
C. Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Wastes
Closely associated with the issue of nuclear fuel reprocessing is the
problem of disposal of high-level nuclear wastes. 71 The fission reaction in
the normal operation of a light-water nuclear reactor generates large quan-
tities of radioactive waste products that can be broadly categorized into
65. NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 57, at 23-24.
66. Testimony of Barry Commoner, supra note 53, at 126.
67. Testimony of Donna Reed Asmus, supra note 54, at 99.
68. Staley, SMUD Scrambles to Store Used Radioactive Fuel, Sacramento Bee, Aug. 20,
1975, at BI, col. 5.
69. Testimony of Donna Reed Asmus, supra note 54, at 99-100.
70. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(b).
71. The term "waste disposal" may be misleading since it implies a process by which
waste may be treated to render it less toxic. "Waste disposal" is another name for waste
storage and management, since the passage of time is the only known means by which
radioactive wastes can be detoxified. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 637 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For a discussion of issues
concerning the waste disposal process, see ERDA-33, supra note 48; Rowe & Holcomb, The
Hidden Commitment of Nuclear Wastes, 24 NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 286 (1974); Kubo & Rose,
Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, 182 SCIENCE 118 (1973).
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fission products72 and fission by-products. 73 High-level wastes are charac-
terized generally by their high heat generation rates, and their long toxic
lives. 74 Section 25524.2 requires a finding by the ERCDC that there is an
approved and existing method for the permanent and terminal disposal of
high-level nuclear wastes as a condition precedent to the siting of nuclear
power plants. 75 The need for a permanent method of disposing of high-level
wastes is undisputed. 76 Plutonium, for example, will require almost 250,000
years of storage to render it harmless. 77 It has been judicially noted that most
high-level waste will pose a human health hazard for hundreds of years and
will require special treatment to isolate it from the environment. 7 In some
respects, it may not be too inaccurate to depict the problem of high-level
nuclear waste disposal as "akin to a Faustian bargain or technical fix made
by energy junkies and bequeathed to defenseless future generations." 79
An average light-water reactor annually produces about seven metric tons
of high-level nuclear wastes80 that require some form of effective long-term
disposal to prevent radioactive contamination of the environment.81 High-
level nuclear wastes pose a severe human health hazard, 82 and exposure to
high-level radioactive wastes can be fatal. Plutonium is one of the most
toxic substances known to mankind and inhalation of a single microscopic
particle may be sufficient to induce cancer. 83 Hazardous radiation contami-
nation to humans can be the result of direct contact, ingestion or inhalation,
or indirect contamination through the environment.8 4 The principal
72. Fission products are the smaller atomic fragments of the split uranium atoms including
such elements as strontium-90 and cesium-137. CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 39, at 5.
73. Fission by-products are also referred to as actinide or transuranic wastes. Actinides
include such elements as actinium, protactinium, thorium, neptunium, americium, and curium.
Transuranic elements are all man-made and consist of neptunium and all heavier elements. Id.
74. Id. at 7.
75. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.2.
76. See 547 F.2d at 639 n.1.
77. Farney, Ominous Problem: What to do with Radioactive Waste, SMITHSONIAN MAG.,
April 1974, at 20.
Operation [of a nuclear facility] will also produce substantial quantities of other
'high-level' radioactive wastes in the form of strontium-90 and cesium-137 which,
with their shorter, 30-year half-lives, must be isolated from the environment for
'only' 600 to 1000 years.
547 F.2d at 638-39.
78. 547 F.2d at 639 n.ll; Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
481 F.2d 1079, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. Margaret N. Maxey, associate professor of bioethics at the University of Detroit,
quoted in, [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) no.41, at 1557.
80. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, LAND USE, AND ENERGY, NUCLEAR WASTE
DISPOSAL AND TRANSPORTATION: A STAFF BACKGROUND PAPER 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL AND TRANSPORTATION].
81. For a discussion of various methods for storing high-level nuclear wastes, see general-
ly Swan, Management of High-Level Radioactive Wastes: The AEC and the Legal Process,
1973 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 263, 272-81.
82. Fox. RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AEC No. IB-508, 14-15 (rev. ed. 1969), quoted in, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633,
638 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
83. 547 F.2d at 638. See Luschbauch & Langham, A Dermal Lesion from Implanted
Plutonium, 86 ARCHIVES OF DERMATOLOGY, Oct. 1962, at 121-24.
84. See CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 39, at 15.
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scenarios for release of nuclear wastes are: (1) accidental and routine
emissions from reprocessing facilities; (2) accidents during shipment of
spent fuel; (3) spills or leaks of liquid wastes during interim storage; and (4)
breakup and leaking of solidified waste placed in long-term disposal sites. 85
Current federal regulations require commercial reprocessing plants to
solidify high-level wastes no later than five years after they are generated.8 6
These wastes must be delivered to the NRC and sealed in manageable-sized
containers no later than ten years following the separation of the fission
products from the irradiated fuel. 87 Notwithstanding these regulations, there
is presently no technology to effectively solidify wastes, and there is no
location at which these wastes can be permanently stored. 88 Nuclear power
critics have pointed to the lack of available waste disposal technology in an
effort to slow power plant construction. 89 Surprisingly, one NRC commis-
sioner has recently conceded that "although several available technologies
have been researched, demonstration scale information is lacking and no
agreed upon plan for long-term high-level waste management exists. "90
Nevertheless, then Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson has publicly
stated that he is confident that the technology exists to safely handle the
wastes produced by the nuclear industry. 91
The federal government has been under pressure to develop and imple-
ment a high-level waste management program schedule. Despite the exist-
ence of temporary storage facilities for nuclear wastes, 92 no decision has
been made on permanent storage methods and the handling of wastes is
subject to current studies by the Energy Research and Development Ad-
85. NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL AND TRANSPORTATION, supra note 80, at 8, 11.
86. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. F(2) (1977).
87. Id.
88. Colby, supra note 51, at 72.
89. See, e.g., In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., ALAB-56, 4 AEC 930 (June 6,
1972), II-J.A. 261-62, wherein environmentalists submitted the following:
Except for the storage of liquid wastes in tanks, for which experience from weapons
production applies, all proposals for long term storage or disposal of high level waste
from the nuclear power industry lie at the research and development stage. . .The
impression is inescapable, in view of the present imprecise state of affairs, that no
convincing statements exist regarding the long term environmental impact attending
the storage and/or disposal of wastes from fuel reprocessing . . .The times during
which radioactive wastes must remain secure from the biosphere have no parallel in
human affairs. Eight hundred years are required for fission products alone and
millions of years if the fission products continue to be contaminated with transuranic
elements at present levels. Fission technology requires that man issue guarantees on
events far into the future, and it is not clear in most cases that this can be done.
Institutional arrangements do not exist and never have existed to guarantee the
monitoring of or attendance upon storage facilities over a millennium. In the range of
a million years, serious geological uncertainties arise and even the survival of man
may be doubtful. "In perpetuity" has little real meaning in human affairs.
90. Hearings on Proposition 15 the Nuclear Initiative Before the California State Assembly
Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, Nov. 5, 1975, vol. VIII, at 3 (statement of Dr.
Terry Lash, quoting remarks by Comm'r Edward Mason).
91. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.144, at A-12.
92. The United States has in temporary storage approximately 72 million gallons of
military nuclear waste (about one-half in solid form) and about 600,000 gallons of commercial
liquid wastes. Id. at A-13.
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ministration and the NRC. 93 Under federally-established goals for a pro-
jected waste management program, high-level waste solidification technolo-
gy would not be available until 1983, 91 and a technology for packaging,
transporting, and handling spent fuel bundles for terminal storage under a
throwaway fuel cycle95 would not be available until 1984.96 Pursuant to
Section 25524.2, it is not necessary that facilities for the application of this
technology be in operation at the time the ERCDC must make its findings; 97
nevertheless, it appears that a federal decision on acceptable high-level
waste disposal technologies is still on the horizon. Even if federal goals
concerning waste disposal technologies are realized, the conditions imposed
by the new California siting legislation may delay new nuclear plant con-
struction until the 1980's. Thus, the impact of the waste disposal provisions
could be substantial since the problems associated with the management of
high-level radioactive wastes have yet to be solved.
High-level nuclear wastes are the deadliest products produced by modern
energy technology. The new California siting legislation requires that there
be an available technology to permanently store these wastes prior to
allowing new construction of thermal nuclear power plants in the state. The
debate over waste disposal technologies has not ended, and it does not
appear likely that this problem will be solved before the 1980's. Conse-
quently, Section 25524.2 could have a severe impact on new power plant
construction in California.
The foregoing discussion should facilitate an understanding of the manner
by which California's new power plant siting provisions may affect the
development of nuclear power. It appears to be the concern of the legislature
that certain findings be made as conditions precedent to the siting of new
nuclear power plants in the state. The legislature has manifested the intent
that prior to committing this state to the construction of more nuclear power
plants, additional information should be made available respecting under-
ground siting and berm containment of reactors. 98 Furthermore, the legisla-
ture has, in effect, declared that power plants which depend on the reproces-
sing of nuclear fuel should not be sited in the state if there is no method by
which their spent fuel may be recycled. 99 Similarly, the legislature has
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. For a discussion of the throwaway alternative to reprocessing, see note 51 supra and
accompanying text.
96. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no. 144, at A-13.
97. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.2(c) reads:
As used in this section "technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear
waste" means a method for the permanent and terminal disposition of high-level
nuclear waste. It shall not necessarily require that facilities for the application of such
technology and/or means be available at the time the commission makes its findings,
Such disposition shall not necessarily preclude the possibility of an approved process
for retrieval of such waste.
98. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3.
99. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1.
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expressed its concern over the dangers inherent in high-level nuclear wastes
and has declared that no new nuclear power plants should be permitted land
use in California until the waste disposal problem has been solved.l°°
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
CONCERNING WASTE DISPOSAL AND REPROCESSING
In part, the new California siting provisions reflect a legislative concern
about the failure of the federal government to consider fully in its nuclear
licensing process, 101 certain problems associated with nuclear power de-
velopment. A recent federal court of appeals case, 102 decided subsequent to
the passage of the California siting legislation, however, will force the NRC
to consider more fully in its licensing decisions the environmental impact of
reprocessing and nuclear waste disposal.103
It has heretofore been the position of the NRC that federal licensing
boards need consider only the environmental effect of transporting fuel to a
reactor and wastes to a reprocessing plant, and the boards need not consider
the environmental impact of waste disposal and reprocessing in the individu-
al licensing proceedings. 104 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,°105 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reviewed an NRC order granting a full-term
operating license to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station located
near Vernon, Vermont and considered the rulemaking proceedings which
had concluded that the environmental effects of nuclear waste disposal were
insignificant. 10 6 The central issue presented in the case was whether a
federal licensing board was required, pursuant to the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 107 to consider the environmental impact of reprocessing and
waste disposal in its decision to license a particular nuclear power plant.10 8 It
was the position of the NRC that consideration of reprocessing and waste
disposal in individual licensing proceedings was too speculative and was
more appropriately considered when reprocessing and waste disposal
facilities were themselves licensed. 109 The court rejected these contentions
and remanded the licensing order, stating:
100. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.2.
101. For a discussion of the federal licensing process, see generally Power Reactor Dev.
Corp. v. IUEW, 367 U.S. 396 (1961); Price, Current Approach to Licensing Nuclear Power
Plants, 15 AToM. ENERGY L.J. 227 (1974); Ramey, Old and New Concepts in Siting and
Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 9 FORUM 211 (1973); Shuper, Licensing of Nuclear Power
Reactors in the United States-New Developments, 15 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 135 (1973).
102. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 641.
104. See 10 C.F.R. §51.20 (1977); In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., ALAB-56,
4 AEC 930 (June 6, 1972), I.J.A. 72, 76.
105. 547 F.2d at 633.
106. Id. at 637-38.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (1970).
108. 547 F.2d at 637-38.
109. Id. at 640.
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Decisions to license nuclear reactors which generate large
amounts of toxic wastes requiring special isolation from the envi-
ronment for several centuries are a paradigm of "irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources" which must receive "de-
tailed" analysis under §102(2) (C) (v) of [the National Environ-
mental Policy Act]. . .. We therefore hold that absent effective
generic proceedings to consider these issues, they must be dealt
with in individual licensing proceedings. 110
The court's ruling, in effect, will require the NRC either to consider the
particularized environmental impact of reprocessing and waste disposal in
the individual licensing proceedings, or to hold generic proceedings, 111 to
determine their environmental impact. The court included in its opinion, a
lengthy discussion of the methods by which the NRC could promulgate rules
consistent with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act. 112
At first glance, Natural Resources Defense Council appears to be an
important complement to the new California siting laws concerning repro-
cessing and waste disposal. Unlike the California provision involving nuc-
lear fuel reprocessing, 113 which appears to be motivated primarily by
economic considerations," 4 Natural Resources Defense Council will re-
quire the NRC to consider the environmental impact of the reprocessing
requirements of individual nuclear power plants. 115 The new California
provision dealing with waste disposal 16 and Natural Resources Defense
Council"7 both seek to assure that decisions respecting nuclear power plants
are made with a full consideration of the problems of radioactive waste
disposal. Thus, Natural Resources Defense Council appears to require the
NRC to include in its licensing decision, consideration of some problem
areas which the new California siting legislation requires the ERCDC to
consider-specifically, the environmental effects of reprocessing and waste
disposal.
The extent to which Natural Resources Defense Council may have
inadvertently succeeded in complementing the new California siting laws,
however, may be limited. This conclusion can be supported by analyzing
the method by which the NRC has chosen to comply with Natural Re-
sources Defense Council. The NRC has proposed new rules that call for a
110. Id. at 641.
Ill. Generic hearings are administrative proceedings in which the NRC considers the
environmental impact of waste disposal and reprocessing involving a class of reactors. The
alternative to generic rulemaking is to consider the environmental impact of waste disposal and
reprocessing in each licensing decision. See id. at 641-43.
112. Id.
113. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1.
114. See text accompanying notes 53-61 supra.
115. 547 F.2d at 641.
116. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.2.
117. 547 F.2d at 641.
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generic explanation and documentation of the environmental effects of
reprocessing and waste disposal. 118 The new rules appear to demonstrate the
federal commission's desire to avoid adjudicative hearings on the issues of
reprocessing and waste disposal in each licensing decision. As a result, it
appears unlikely that the new rules will result in any significantly greater
considerations of reprocessing and waste disposal; the new rules do not
include a new analysis of these issues, but are based on existing information
that presents a summary of the present state of reprocessing and waste
disposal technology. 119 On the other hand, it is argued that comments on the
proposed rules may add some new information concerning the NRC's
judgments involving the existing data. 120
The preceding analysis suggests that there may be some future judicial
activity concerning federal agency consideration of reprocessing and waste
disposal. Although further decisions along the lines of Natural Resources
Defense Council will not displace the new California siting laws, such
decisions may result in more careful considerations of reprocessing and
waste disposal by the NRC. Increased judicial scrutiny of federal licensing
decisions could have the effect of complementing the new state siting
118. 41 Fed. Reg. 45849 (1976). The NRC has issued a general policy statement announcing
its intention to reopen its rulemaking proceedings on the environmental effects of the nuclear
fuel cycle.
The Commission chose to prepare a well documented supplement to the survey to
establish a basis for identifying environmental impacts associated with fuel reproc-
essing and waste management activities that are attributable to the licensing of a
model light-water reactor.
Id. at 45850. The revised survey, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REPROCESSING AND WASTE
MANAGEMENT PORTIONS OF THE LWR FUEL CYCLE (NUREG-01 16, 1976), was released to the
public on October 13, 1976. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.166, at A-25.
.119. The NRC survey is a review of current publicly available data relating to reprocessing
and waste management. 41 Fed. Reg. 45850 (1976). William Bishop, the chief of the nuclear
waste management section of the NRC, has stated that the supplement contains no new analysis
and. that the emergence of new data that might alter the final rules is not foreseen. [1976] EN.
USERS REP. (BNA) no. 166, at A-25. Furthermore, it appears that the method by which the NRC
has chosen to comply with Natural Resources Defense Council has realized a concern ex-
pressed in the concurring opinion of that case. Noting the likelihood that further rulemaking
proceedings by the NRC would not, in all probability, alter the outcome of the licensing
decision, Judge Tamm stated:
I believe it almost inevitable that, after fully considering the problems and alternative
methods of waste disposal and storage, the [NRC] will reach the same conclusion and
therefore see little to be gained other than delay from imposing increased adversarial
procedures in excess of those customarily required.
547 F.2d at 660 (Judge Tamm, concurring). The majority also stressed that there are limits to the
guarantees afforded by the National Environmental Policy Act. The majority opinion stated:
NEPA does not guarantee a particular outcome on the merits; rather, the statute
mandates only a "careful and informed decision-making process" to enlighten the
decisionmaker and the public.
Id. at 654. Thus, even though Natural Resources Defense Council requires the NRC to afford
greater consideration to the problems of reprocessing and waste disposal, the federal commis-
sion may still be allowed to license nuclear power plants and base its decision to do so on the
same kinds of information that it relied upon prior to the circuit court's decision. If it can be
assumed that the new NRC rules, if adopted, will comply with the procedural requirements
outlined in Natural Resources Defense Council, the extent to which the federal commission's
decisions can be reviewed still will be limited by the customary "arbitrary and capricious"
standard applied by the courts to establish abuse of agency discretion. See id. at 660 (Judge
Tamm, concurring).
120. Where data needed for a complete assessment is lacking, the NRC's expert judgment
will be brought to bear on the available information. The soundness of these judgments is
expected to be addressed in comments to the proposed rules. 41 Fed. Reg. 45851 (1976).
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provisions, or it might provide an impetus to resolve the technological
problems surrounding reprocessing and waste disposal. In the latter event,
the likelihood of satisfying the reprocessing and waste disposal provisions of
the new California siting laws could be increased.
PERMISSIBLE STATE REGULATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:
THE DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
The "supremacy clause" of the United States Constitution' 2' provides the
basis for the doctrine of preemption. In its simplest form, the preemption
doctrine provides that when Congress, by exercise of its enumerated pow-
ers, has manifested an intent to exclusively occupy a field of regulation,
state enactments in the occupied field are invalid. 122 This doctrine is of
particular importance when discussing the new California siting legislation,
since the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has been characterized as containing
some of the most complex and pervasive regulations ever enacted. 123 Thus,
the fact that California has enacted legislation in an area where Congress has
devised a comprehensive regulatory scheme raises the spectre of preemp-
tion. If the new California siting laws are found to have intruded upon an
area of nuclear power regulation preempted by the federal government, the
state's laws will be subject to invalidation by a court challenge. The extent
to which the states are precluded from enacting legislation in the field of
atomic energy has not been completely defined, however, and any discus-
sion of the California siting legislation must attempt to ascertain the per-
missible scope of state regulatory authority governing atomic energy.
A. The Preemption Doctrine
While a lengthy discussion of the development of the preemption doctrine
is beyond the scope of this comment, it is necessary to outline the basic
tenets of the doctrine in order to understand its application to the field of
nuclear power. The preemption doctrine was first applied in a commerce
case, Gibbons v. Odgen, 124 wherein the United States Supreme Court found
state laws which "collided" with congressional exercise of commerce
power to be invalid."2 Although the preemption doctrine has been applied
chiefly in commerce clause cases, 126 it may be applied in any field where
there is a legitimate exercise of a federal power.127 Once there has been a
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 reads in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States .... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land ....
122. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
123. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
124. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
125. Id. at 210.
126. Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 52 (1973).
127. Examples of areas where the United States Supreme Court has considered the
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determination that Congress has exercised one of its enumerated powers, the
courts must then ascertain whether this power has been exercised in a
manner that excludes state action in the field.
The most easily resolved preemption situation arises in those cases where
compliance with both the federal and state regulation is impossible. In these
conflict cases the Supreme Court has found no need to inquire into congres-
sional design in establishing the federal regulation and will find preemp-
tion. 128 If the Court finds no direct conflict it will nonetheless find preemp-
tion if Congress has unequivocally and expressly declared that the authority
conferred by the federal legislation is to be exclusive. 129 When Congress has
expressly preempted state activity in a field, there is no doubt that concomit-
ant or supplementary state regulation cannot be asserted in the occupied
field. 130
Application of the preemption doctrine becomes considerably more com-
plicated when there is neither direct conflict nor has Congress expressly
excluded the states from regulating in the field. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has been willing to find, in certain cases, that federal preemption may
be implied. 131 A variety of factors has been considered in finding implied
preemption, including inter alia: (1) legislative intent revealed by the
statute and by its legislative history; 132 (2) the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme to ascertain the extent to which Congress has intended to
occupy the field; 133 (3) the nature of the subject matter and the extent to
which exclusive federal regulation is needed to achieve uniformity vital to
national interests;1 34 and (4) the extent that the state action presents an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress in enacting the legislation. 135
The preemption doctrine is not clearly defined. In fact, the Supreme
Court has gone so far as to say that "prior cases on pre-emption are not
precise guidelines." 136 At best it can be said that the courts will consider the
peculiarities and special features of the particular regulatory scheme' 37 and
will construe the questionable state statute by considering many factors.1
38
preemption question include labor law, maritime law, agricultural marketing and quarantines,
sedition, alien registration, patents, government procurement, and state taxation and regulation
of federal contractors. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 515, 516 [hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
128. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
129. See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
130. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1946).
131. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926).
132. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). See
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-02 (1961).
133. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956).
134. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959).
135. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
136. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1974).
137. Id.
138. Hirsch, supra note 127, at 516-25.
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When addressing the issue of preemption the courts have been persuaded by
the particular area of regulation involved. 13 9 For example, state statutes that
purport to protect the public health and safety have been held to be valid in
the absence of a direct conflict with federal law or a clear manifestation of
congressional intent to exclude state action in the field. 140 To understand
fully the effect of the preemption doctrine on the new California siting laws,
it is important to discuss federal preemption in the field of atomic energy
and to define the scope of permissible state regulatory authority over nuclear
power plants.
B. The Preemption Doctrine and State Regulation of Nuclear Power
The recent emergence of state regulatory activity in the field of nuclear
energy 141 has stirred inquiries into the constitutional question of federal
preemption of the field. 42 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides the
basis for federal preemption of nuclear power regulation. As will be noted,
the Atomic Energy Act clearly delineates the manner and extent to which the
federal government and the states may cooperate in the regulation of nuclear
power. The pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and the develop-
ing case law concerning preemption in this field must be examined to
ascertain the extent of state authority to regulate nuclear power production.
1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
Nuclear power was born during a war and was nurtured in secrecy in the
research conducted by the Manhattan Engineering District of the Army
Corps of Engineers. 143 The first civilian application of atomic power for
peacetime use was authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.144 That
act created the Atomic Energy Commission [hereinafter referred to as the
AEC] 145 and vested in that commission, total ownership and control of all
nuclear materials. 146 Nuclear facilities were operated either by the AEC or
through contracts with private persons entered into by that commission. 147 A
139. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 653 (1975).
140. See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Service v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413
(1973); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (19,9).
141. See text accompanying notes 1-6 sup-a.
142. See, e.g., Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and
the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1976); Com-
ment, Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act of *195.4: Permissible State Regulation of
Nuclear Facilities 'Location, Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Waste Disposal, 11
TULSA L.J. 397 (1976).
143. For a brief discussion of the birth and early development of nuclear power in the
United States, see Von Mehern, The Development and Use of Nuclear Power-Some Reflec-
tions on Legal Problems, I ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 3 (1959).
144. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, now Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C. §§2011-2296 (1970).
145. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, §2(a) (1), 60 Stat. 756. In 1974, the Atomic
Energy Commission was abolished and the regulatory functions of the AEC were transferred to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 42 U.S.C. §5841(f) (Supp. IV 1974).
146. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, §5(a)(2), (4), 60 Stat. 760.
147. Id. at §7(a), 60 Stat. 764.
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complicated licensing and regulating procedure was established to govern
the private utilization of nuclear materials. 48 The Atomic Energy Act of
1946 was enacted to direct the development of atomic energy in a manner
that would "improve the public welfare, increase the standard of living,
strengthen free competition in private enterprise, and promote world
peace."' 149 Because there was still a close association between nuclear
power and national security, however, the primary objective of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 was to secure the common defense and security. 150
In the years that followed the 1946 act it became evident that the use of
atomic energy for electric power generation was to become a reality, and the
need to further involve private enterprise in nuclear power development was
realized. 151 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 introduced three major changes
in the federal control of nuclear energy. This new regulatory scheme
allowed for: (1) private ownership and operation of production and utiliza-
tion facilities under a federal license; 152 (2) private ownership of by-
product'53 and source material 54 under license; 155 and (3) leasing of special
nuclear material. 156 This act was enacted because of the belief that the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was not responsive to the changes that had
148. Id. at §4(c) (1), (2), 60 Stat. 759.
149. Id. at §l(a), 60 Stat. 755.
150. Id. For a detailed discussion of the design and purpose of the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, see Helman, Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear
Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 43, 51-53 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Helman].
151. See S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 reprinted in [1954] U.S.CooE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3456, 3464.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§2131-2133 (1970). 42 U.S.C. §2014(v) defines production facility as:
(1) any equipment or device determined by rule of the Commission to be capable of
the production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of significance to
the common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the health and
safety of the public; or (2) any important component part especially designed for such
equipment or device as determined by the Commission.
42 U.S.C. §2014(cc) defines utilization facility as:
(1) any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined by rule of the
Commission to be capable of making use of special nuclear material in such quantity
as to be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner as to
affect the health and safety of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making use of
atomic energy in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and
security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any
important component part especially designed for such equipment or device as
determined by the Commission.
153. 42 U.S.C. §2014(e) defines by-product material as:
[A]ny radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made
radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or
utilizing special nuclear material.
154. 42 U.S.C. §2014(z) defines source material as:
(1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission
pursuant to the provisions of section 61 [42 USCS §2091] to be source material; or (2)
ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the
Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.
155. 42 U.S.C. §§2092, 2111 (1970).
156. 42 U.S.C. §2073 (1970). 42 U.S.C. §2014(aa) defines special nuclear material as:
(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any
other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51 [42
USCS §2071], determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source
material; or (2) any material artifically enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not
include source material.
In 1964, the Atomic Energy Act was amended to allow for private ownership of special nuclear
material. Act of Aug. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, §4, 78 Stat. 603.
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occured in the development of atomic energy. 157 Furthermore, to provide
economically competitive nuclear energy it was felt that private concerns
should be encouraged to enter into the field. 58 The Atomic Energy Act of
1954 clearly states that its purpose, inter alia, is to promote private partici-
pation in the development of peaceful atomic power. 5 9 Essentially, the
government's monopoly over fissionable materials and nuclear facilities was
exchanged for a pervasive federal licensing scheme, designed to encourage
a private nuclear power industry.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contained extensive language defining
the regulatory authority of the federal government over the private uses of
atomic energy; the act contained little language to assist the states in
defining their role in regulating the nuclear power industry. States historical-
ly have exercised regulatory authority over research facilities and the radio-
active materials produced therein, certain naturally occurring radiation, and
the radiation from x-ray apparatus." 6° Nevertheless, the use of fissionable
materials to generate electric power presents a grave potential health hazard
if not carefully regulated.' 61 Consequently, the states have a tremendous
interest in the efficacy of regulations aimed at protecting the public health
and safety.
In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act 62 and clarified the
division of regulatory responsibility between federal and state governments
with respect to source, by-product and special nuclear materials. 163 Section
274 of the Atomic Energy Act was amended to permit the AEC to enter into
agreements providing for discontinuance of certain regulatory authority of
the Commission, thereby allowing the states to exercise exclusive regulatory
authority in certain areas."' 4 The language of the amendment was clear,
indicating that concurrent regulatory authority in the specified area was not
intended by the Congress' 65 and state authority was to be exclusive over
source, by-product, and special nuclear material in quantities insufficient to
157. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3456, 3459.
158. Id.
159. 42 U.S.C. §2013(d) (1970). The Atomic Energy Act also sought to broaden internation-
al cooperation in the field of atomic power and to improve procedures for the control and
dissemination of atomic power information. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted
in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3456, 3460.
160. Helman, supra note 150, at 54.
161. For a discussion of the potential health and safety harms of nuclear power, see
generally J. GOFMAN & A. TAMPLIN, POISONED POWER: THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS (1971); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE: A SURVEY OF
THE POSSIBLE HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR
POWER (1975).
162. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, §1, 73 Stat. 688 (amending 42 U.S.C. §2021
(1970)).
163. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG, & AD.
NEWS 2872, 2878.
164. 42 U.S.C. §2021(b) (1970).
165. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2872, 2879.
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form a critical mass.166 To date, the AEC has entered into turnover agree-
ments for state assumption of regulatory authority with 25 states 167 and the
limits of state authority are determined by the language of the particular
agreement. 168
Despite the existence of turnover agreements, the AEC may not relin-
quish authority with respect to the construction and operation of production
or utilization facilities, the export or import of source, by-product, or special
nuclear materials, or radioactive waste disposal. 169 The result of the 1959
amendment is that the AEC is authorized to withdraw its regulatory authori-
ty over certain materials-principally radioisotopes-but not over the more
hazardous activities such as the licensing and regulation of nuclear power. 170
The exclusive nature of federal control over radiation hazards associated
with nuclear power can be established by the legislative history of the 1959
amendment. 171 After conducting hearings on the amendment, the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy clearly stated that the AEC was to have
"exclusive authority to regulate for protection against radiation hazards
until such time as the state enters into an agreement with the Commission to
assume such responsibility.'1 72 This has also been the traditional position of
the AEC with respect to power plant operation and emissions of radioactive
166. 42 U.S.C. §2021(b) (1970). Those quantities considered insufficient to form a critical
mass are defined at 10 C:F.R. §150.11 (1977).
167. 1 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 19,001. Kentucky, California, Mississippi, New York,
Texas, Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Kansas, Oregon, Tennessee, New Hampshire,
Alabama, Nebraska, Washington, Arizona, Louisiana, Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, and New Mexico have entered into turnover agreements
with the NRC. Id.
168. See Neel, Federal or State Jurisdiction Over Atomic Products and Waste-A Dilem-
ma, 50 Ky. L.J. 52, 54 (1961).
169. 42 U.S.C. §2021(c) reads:
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) shall provide for discon-
tinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain authority and responsibili-
ty with respect to regulation of-
(1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility;
(2) the export from or import into the United States of byproduct, source, or special
nuclear material, or of any production or utilization facility;
(3) the disposal into the ocean or sea of byproduct, source, or special nuclear waste
materials as defined in regulations or orders of the Commission;
(4) the disposal of such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear material as the
Commission determines by regulation or order should, because of the hazards or
potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of without a license from the
Commission.
Notwithstanding any agreement between the Commission and any State pursuant to
subsection (b), the Commission is authorized by rule, regulation, or order to require
that the manufacturer, processor, or producer of any equipment, device, commodity,
or other product containing source, byproduct, or special nuclear material shall not
transfer possession or control of such product except pursuant to a license issued by
the Commission.
170. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2872, 2874. See generally Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic
Reactors, 50 KY. L.J. 29 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Cavers].
171. See generally S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872.
172. Id. at 12, [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2883.
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effluents from such facilities, 173 and this position has been supported by the
courts. 
17 4
The 1959 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act also included a provision
concerning the authority of the states to regulate the non-radiological aspects
of nuclear power generation. Subsection (k) of Section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act was amended to read:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of
any state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards.175
Non-radiation hazards have been defined by the courts to include the
location of a reactor at or near an active earthquake fault; 176 the creation and
effects of steam, fog, and icing from a nuclear plant's cooling pond; 177 and
non-radiation source pollution from nuclear power plants. 178 Other areas
which historically have been left to state regulation include aspects of plant
construction and operation such as plumbing and electricity, and working
conditions of plant employees, 179 site selection 80 and application of local
zoning authority, 18' and state and local efforts to regulate power consump-
tion.' 82 It should be noted, however, that the extent to which a state may
legitimately exercise control over non-radiation aspects of nuclear power
still may be limited under the preemption doctrine. 183 The remainder of this
section will be devoted to determining the extent to which states are
preempted from regulating radiation and non-radiation problems associated
with nuclear power plants.
173. 10 C.F.R. §8.4 (1977).
174. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
175. 42 U.S.C. §2021(k) (1970) (emphasis added).
176. Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v. PUC, 61 Cal. 2d 126,
390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr 432 (1964).
177. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
178. See Note, Federal and State Responsibility in the Environmental Control of Nuclear
Power Plants, 2 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 20, 31-32 (1972).
179. Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Rela-
tions Problem, 60 MICH. L. REV. 41, 60-61 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Estep & Adelman].
180. See Lemov, State and Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors Under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1008 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Lemovl.
The author concludes that there is concurrent power over the location of commercial power
plants and preemption should not be inferred from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Id. at 1026.
See also Note, Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Additional Reductions in State Authority?, 28 U.
FLA. L. REV. 439 (1976).
181. Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulations of Power Plant Siting: Existing
and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502, 539-46 (1973). See generally Stone, Power
Siting: A Challenge to the Legal Process, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1971).
182. Note, Federal and State Responsibility in the Environmental Control of NuclearPower
Plants, 2 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 20, 31 (1972).
183. See, e.g., Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237,263-64,237 N.W.2d
266, 282 (1975); A. MURPHY & D. LA PIERRE, NUCLEAR "MORATORIUM" LEGISLATION IN THE
STATES AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A CASE OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION 93-97 (Atomic Indus.
Forum, 1975) [hereinafter cited as MURPHY & LA PIERRE]; Comment, Preemption Under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State Regulation of Nuclear Facilities' Location,
Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Waste Disposal, 11 TULSA L.J. 397, 404-05
(1976).
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2. Application of the Preemption Doctrine to State Control of Radiation
Hazards: The Northern States Decision
There is no doubt that Congress has acted within its delegated authority in
establishing a regulatory scheme over atomic energy. 184 Congress has based
its authority to regulate atomic power on the constitutionally granted author-
ity concerning the common defense and security, interstate and foreign
commerce, and promotion of the general welfare. 185 Nevertheless, the
question of federal preemption of atomic energy regulation was not decided
in the federal courts until the case of Northern States Power Company v.
Minnesota,186 and there has been much discussion concerning the scope of
the applicability of the preemption doctrine to this field. 187
Prior to Northern States, at least two state courts had been persuaded to
strike down local ordinances dealing with the disposal of radioactive wastes.
In Boswell v. City of Long Beach ,188 a California Superior Court found the
City of Long Beach powerless to exclude the operation of a federally-
licensed waste disposal facility within its borders.' 8 9 The court found that
since the federal government had "fully occupied" the field of atomic
power, the city's power was limited "to such regulation as does not
unreasonably interfere with state or federal action." 19 A New York Sup-
reme Court made a similar ruling, finding that the AEC had sole authority to
regulate the disposal of radioactive wastes. 191 Furthermore, the attorneys
general of at least two states had issued opinions to the effect that the federal
assertion of authority in certain areas of control over radiation hazards of
atomic energy takes precedence over state laws on the subject. 192 The
emerging view prior to Northern States appeared to be that the control of
radiation hazards and waste disposal was preempted by the federal govern-
ment and states were precluded from the enactment of conflicting, or in
certain instances, complementary regulatory schemes.
Northern States was the first federal court decision to address the issue of
preemption in the field of atomic energy. The sole question presented to the
court was whether the state regulation of the discharge of radioactive wastes
from a proposed nuclear power plant was preempted by the Atomic Energy
184. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
185. 42 U.S.C. §§2011, 2012 (1970). See generally Estep & Adelman, supra note 179, at
44-54.
186. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
187. See note 144 supra.
188. 1 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 4045 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1960).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Lewis v. Alexander, 4 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 16,579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
192. The Attorney General of North Carolina has concluded that the federal government
has preempted state control over radioactive materials. 5 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 16,545.
The Attorney General of South Dakota has determined that state power to regulate and control
radiation from atomic power plants is preempted by the federal government. 5 ATOM. EN. L.
REP. (CCH) 16,561.
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Act. 9 3 The case involved a Minnesota waste disposal permit requirement
that imposed conditions on radiocative discharge levels substantially more
stringent than those required by the AEC. 194 The district court, 195 in a
declaratory judgment, found both express and implied preemption.196 The
court concluded that there was a clear expression of congressional intent to
preempt, in both the statutory language' 97 and legislative history19s of the
Atomic Energy Act. The court, in response to possible doubts over the
finding of express preemption, also held that the pervasiveness of federal
regulation in the field justified a further finding of implied preemption. 199
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the declaratory judgment but refined
the basis upon which it was reasoned.2" ° The court found no physical
impossibility of dual compliance with both sets of regulations.2 10 Further-
more, the circuit court found there was no statutory provision wherein
Congress expressly declared that the federal government was to have sole
and exclusive authority to regulate radioactive emissions from nuclear
power plants. 202 It was the court's opinion, however, that preemption of
radiation safety could be implied from the legislative history of the Atomic
Energy Act,20 3 and that a finding of preemption could further be supported
by the need for uniform national regulation in the field of nuclear energy. 204
It seems clear from the Northern States case that the federal government has
preempted the field of regulation of radiation problems associated with
nuclear power plants. However, Northern States has left undecided the
question of state control over the non-radiation hazards of atomic power.20 5
3. The Unresolved Question of State Control Over Non-radiation
Hazards of Nuclear Power
It can be stated with some certainty that state action attempting to regulate
radioactive emissions from nuclear power plants is preempted by federal
regulation. 20 6 Additionally, it appears logical to infer that the finding of
implied preemption will extend to those state statutes that, on their face,
193. 447 F.2d at 1144.
194. Id. at 1145.
195. 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970). For a discussion of the district court decision, see
55 MINN. L. REv. 1223 (1971).
196. 320 F. Supp. at 179.
197. Id. at 175. The court failed to find an expression of intent to preempt in the original
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However, it found the language of the 1959 amendment to that act
sufficient to manifest such an intent. Id. See text accompanying notes 162-75 supra.
198. Id. at 175-76.
199. Id. at 178-79.
200. 447 F.2d 1143.
201. Id. at 1147.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1147-52.
204. Id. at 1153-54.
205. The United States Supreme Court affirmed Northern States without rendering an
opinion. 405 U.S. 1035 (1971). Northern States has also been cited by the Court in at least one
case dealing with nuclear energy. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1, 15-18 (1976).
206. See 447 F.2d at 1152.
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attempt to regulate any radiation problems associated with nuclear power
plants.2 °7 The court's opinion in Northern States contains many clues to
help define the areas of permissible state involvement in the field of nuclear
energy. Nonetheless, the decision does not define radiation hazards, nor
does it address the limits of state regulatory authority over non-radiation
hazards of nuclear power plants. As previously noted, the Atomic Energy
Act does not purport to preempt the right of states to "regulate activities for
purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. "208 Nevertheless,
no federal court has addressed this issue, and the extent to which a state may
regulate in the non-radiation field is uncertain.
Some state court decisions have touched on the question of state regula-
tory authority in areas other than protection against radiation hazards. In In
re Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ,209 the New York
Supreme Court for the Ninth Judicial District considered whether a provi-
sion in a federal license that required the licensee to obtain "all government
approvals" necessary to construct a closed-cycle cooling system included
local zoning approvals. 210 The court held that there was implied preemption
in the field of atomic energy, and that to require a licensee to secure local
permits and zoning variances or face shutting down the nuclear facility
would unduly interfere with federal agency regulation and control. 211 Al-
though zoning authority has been characterized as an area of regulation
historically reserved to the states,212 In re Consolidated Edison suggests that
there may be some limits to its application when the zoning authority is used
in a manner that might interfere with the operation of a federally licensed
power plant.
In Marshall v. Consumers Power Company,213 the Michigan Court of
Appeals ruled that under the preemption doctrine, state courts were barred
from considering allegations concerning the workability of the proposed
nuclear plant's emergency core cooling system.214 The court did hold,
however, that state courts could consider issues respecting the non-
radiological hazards from the proposed facility. 215 This conclusion,
nonetheless, was tempered by the court's added opinion that state attempts
207. See id.
208. See text accompanying notes 162-183 supra.
209. 2 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
210. Id.
211. Id. The court cited First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328
U.S. 152 (1946). 2 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). See notes 222-227 infra
and accompanying text. In re Consolidated Edison did not involve the first attempt by a New
York locality to exclude or control nuclear reactors within its territory. In 1963, the majority
leader of the New York City Council introduced legislation to make electricity produced by the
generation of nuclear power unlawful within the city. The ordinance was directed at a particular
application for a federal license, and fearing a protracted legal battle, the licensee abandoned its
plan. Lemov, supra note 180, at 1008.
212. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
213. 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
214. Id. at 247, 237 N.W.2d at 274.
215. Id., 237 N.W.2d at 274-75.
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to control non-radiation hazards at nuclear facilities may be preempted if
they are imposed in a manner which renders the construction of a nuclear
power plant impossible. 21 6
These cases can be rationalized with the reasoning of the Northern States
decision. The federal circuit court in Northern States based its decision, in
part, on the need for uniform controls to effectuate the object and purpose of
the Atomic Energy Act.217 The federal court found that a dual system of
licensing and regulation might result in a state scheme "so overprotective in
the area of health and safety as to unnecessarily stultify the industrial
development and use of atomic energy for the production of electric pow-
er., "21 Although Northern States did not address the issues raised by In re
Consolidated Edison or Marshall, the federal court did refer to a line of
cases that have held state laws to be invalid because they presented "an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' '219
One of the cases cited in Northern States22 is, by way of analogy, of
particular interest to the discussion presented herein. 221 The federal circuit
court cited First Iowa Hydro Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Com-
mission222 wherein the United States Supreme Court found that Congress
had intended to secure the comprehensive development of national water
resources and that the detailed provisions of the Federal Power Act 223 left no
room, or need, for conflicting state controls. 224 The Supreme Court noted
that the Iowa statute requiring the granting of a state permit by the Executive
Council of Iowa as a condition precedent to securing a federal license was
tantamount to state veto power over federal water projects. 221 Such a veto
power, it was reasoned, could destroy the effectiveness of the Federal Power
Act226 and, consequently, only the Federal Power Commission, and not the
Executive Council of Iowa, had authority to decide issues concerning the
construction, operation, and maintenance of dams on navigable water-
ways. 227 Thus, First Iowa stands for the proposition that when Congress has
clearly established a federal objective, such as the development of national
216. Id. at 263-64, 237 N.W.2d at 282. The court reasoned that such an assertion of
authority would be superceded by the greater federal interest in promoting the private develop-
ment of nuclear power. Id.
217. 447 F.2d at 1153.
218. Id. at 1154. See also Helman, supra note 150, at 67.
219. 447 F.2d at 1154.
220. First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
221. For a discussion of the applicability of the First Iowa case to the area of nuclear
power, see MURPHY & LA PIERRE, supra note 183, at 92.
222. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
223. 16 U.S.C. §§791-828(c) (1970).
224. 328 U.S. at 164.
225. Id. See also Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391 (9th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 936 (1954); California Oregon Power Co. v. Superior Court, 45
Cal. 2d 858, 291 P.2d 445 (1955).
226. 328 U.S. at 164.
227. Id. at 182.
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waterways, state enactments that would frustrate the congressional objective
are preempted. Congress has not acted to preempt the states from regulating
nuclear power plants for purposes other than the protection against radiation
hazards from such power plants.22 8 Nevertheless, if there is a clearly stated
national objective to promote nuclear power, state exercise of regulatory
authority in the field of protection against non-radiation hazards may be
limited by the preemption doctrine. The parameters of permissible state
regulation in the field of non-radiation hazards can best be defined by
closely examining the object and purpose of the Atomic Energy Act.
The Atomic Energy Act contains dual objectives of promoting the private
development of atomic power 229 and securing adequate protection of the
public health and safety. 230 Through a complex licensing scheme, Congress
has vested regulatory authority in the NRC "to resolve the proper balance
between desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety stan-
dards." ' 231 In the field of protection against radiation hazards, it has been
firmly established that this balance is to be left exclusively to a federal
agency. 232 The 1959 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act carefully de-
lineates federal and state responsibilities over radiation and non-radiation
health and safety questions. 233 The amendment makes clear that states have
the authority to regulate activities of federal licensees for the "manifold
health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection.' '234
Thus, the 1959 amendment appears to be a reiteration of the long recognized
right of a state to assure through its police powers, the health and safety of
its citizens. 235
To the extent that the balancing of private development needs and radia-
tion health and safety issues is solely a question for the NRC, the considera-
tion of non-radiation public health and safety, and economic issues appears
to be reserved to the states. At one time it was the position of the AEC that
consideration of non-radiological environmental factors was not within the
agency's jurisdiction. 236 Also, those provisions of Section 274 of the
Atomic Energy Act that preclude the discontinuance of federal authority
with respect to "the construction and operation of any production or utiliza-
tion facility" 237 were meant only to pertain to exclusive "regulatory authori-
228. See text accompanying notes 162-181 supra.
229. 42 U.S.C. §§2011(b), 2012(i) (1970). See text accompanying notes 151-159 supra.
230. 42 U.S.C. §2012 (1970). See text accompanying notes 151-159 supra.
231. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153-54(8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
232. Id.
233. See text accompanying notes 161-175 supra.
234. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 12, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2872, 2882.
235. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 53 (1941); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S.
52, 56 (1915).
236. See State of New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission, 406 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.
1969); Note, Federal and State Responsibility in the Environmental Control of Nuclear Power
Plants, 2 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 20, 31-32 (1972).
237. 42 U.S.C. §2021(c) (1) (1970).
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ty [over] the operation of the reactor." 238 NRC regulations describing the
scope of "construction and operation" primarily speak in terms of storage,
handling, and discharge of radioactive materials.2 39
A number of states have enacted legislation relating to the siting of
nuclear power plants reflecting the belief that states have the inherent power
to regulate in non-radiation areas. 24° There has been some judicial construc-
tion supporting this contention. In Northern California Association to
Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission,241
the California Supreme Court held that the state public utilities commission
had the authority to inquire into safety questions regarding the location of an
atomic reactor at or near an active earthquake fault.242 This decision, in
effect, approved the right of the public utilities commission to prohibit the
construction of a nuclear power plant at the Bodega Bay site in Sonoma
County. Thus, it would appear that some states are convinced that prior to
the granting of a federal operating license, when the state is considering sites
for nuclear power plants, it has broad-based power to consider non-radiation
problems in the siting decision.243
However, the state cases are not in complete accord on the extent to
which states may regulate against non-radiation hazards, particularly after
the federal government has issued an operating license. 244 The control of
non-radiation source pollution from nuclear power plants, for example, has
been described as a legitimate area of permissible state regulation. 245
Nevertheless, in State, Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey
Central Power and Light Company,246 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a finding of liability with respect to the death of fish from the discharge
of cold water during a nuclear plant shutdown ordered by the AEC was
precluded under the doctrine of preemption. 24 7 In addition to finding that the
death of the fish was not proximately caused by the plant's discharge of
unheated cooling water, 248 the court further stated that "a finding of nonlia-
bility for Jersey Central [was] also dictated because of federal preemp-
tion." 249 The New Jersey court held that, even though the New Jersey
statute upon which liability was predicated, was not intended to regulate
238. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1149 n.6 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
239. 10 C.F.R. §150.15 (1977).
240. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§25500-25542; MD. ANN, CODE art. 66C, §§766-769
(Supp. 1975).
241. 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr 432 (1964).
242. Id. at 133, 390 P.2d at 204, 37 Cal. Rptr at 436.
243. California has enacted one of the nation's most sophisticated power plant siting laws.
See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
244. See note 101 supra.
245. Cavers, supra note 170, at 49.
246. 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976).
247. Id. at 111, 351 A.2d at 342.
248. Id.
249. Id.
1977 / Nuclear Power Siting
directly the radiation hazards of nuclear power plants, "[a] state may not
interfere directly or indirectly, with a preempted matter, even though the
state's proscription may not have been directed at the particular activity
involved.''250 As a condition of the AEC operating license, the Jersey
Central reactor was forced to shut down because of radiation leakage into
the primary reactor containment and, as a result, the plant was routinely
discharging unheated water to dilute the emission of radioactive waste. 251
The court reasoned that these discharges were an obvious protection against
radiation hazards that were required by the Jersey Central operating license
and state interference with this facet of nuclear power generation was not
permissible. 252 Thus it might be inferred from Jersey Central Power that a
state regulation directed at controlling a non-radiation hazard of an opera-
tional nuclear power plant253 that conflicts with a requirement in the plant's
federal operating license designed to protect against radiation hazards, will
be preempted. If the federal courts choose to follow Jersey Central Power,
states may be severely limited in their ability to regulate the non-radiological
hazards of operational power plants, since such enactments may conflict,
either directly or indirectly, with provisions in the federal operating license
and would be preempted. The holding in Jersey Central Power can be
distinguished from California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and
Harbor, however, since prior to the granting of a federal operating license a
state would be shielded against a preemption challenge involving regula-
tions "for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 254
Since no federal court has considered the issues presented in either
Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor or
Jersey Central Power, there is no definitive test to ascertain precisely the
limits of permissible state regulation of non-radiation hazards. Nevertheless,
Congress has yet to preempt the field of control over non-radiation health
and safety questions and states should be free to engage in reasonable
regulations in this area. 255 State enactments that purport to control non-
radiation hazards and do not conflict with the conditions imposed by the
power plant's operating license, such as reasonable conditions to the siting
of nuclear power plants, may be upheld. 56 It has been suggested that a state
250. Id. at 112, 351 A.2d at 343.
251. Id. at 104, 113-14, 351 A.2d at 338, 343-44.
252. Id. at 115, 351 A.2d at 344.
253. See text accompanying notes 162-183 supra.
254. See 42 U.S.C. §2021(k) (1970); Cavers, supra note 170, at 51.
255. Congress may soon preempt the field of nuclear plant siting. The Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1974 contains provisions for a nuclear energy site center survey. 42 U.S.C. §5845
(Supp. IV 1974). The NRC is undertaking a study with other federal agencies and the states to
review site selection procedures. The study is designed to eliminate duplication of federal,
state, and local site review regulations. However, at present there is no intent to infringe on the
regulatory rights of any government agency. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no. 169, at A-16.
256. See Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 247, 237 N.W.2d 266,
274-75 (1975); In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 2 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH)
20,018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
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enactment distinct from the regulation of radiation hazards would be shel-
tered from preemption under Section 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act, 257
and if the state regulations were not aimed at power plants which were part
of a power system that was supported by a particular federal objective, the
state exercise of authority would probably be upheld. 258 Thus, it appears that
if a state law involves a legitimate concern for non-radiation health and
safety, 259 or economic justification260 and does not unreasonably interfere
with the development of nuclear power or any other federal objective, 261 it
should be sustained by the courts.
THE NEW CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING LEGISLATION
AND THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Since 1976, California has scrutinized very carefully the location of
nuclear power plants within the state. 262 The recently enacted siting legisla-
tion concerning underground siting, reprocessing, and nuclear waste dispos-
al creates new conditions to the certification of, and land use for, new
thermal nuclear power plants. 263 In light of the preemption doctrine, it is
necessary to ascertain whether each of these new power plant siting provi-
sions is a permissible exercise of state regulatory authority over nuclear
energy. Although each of the new laws purports to be a control of land use
by the state, 264 it is likely that the courts would strike down any provision in
the new laws that attempted to control, either directly or indirectly, the
radiation hazards of nuclear power plants. 265 It is important to note that if
any of these new siting provisions is declared unconstitutional, it would be
severable from the Public Resources Code and would not affect the constitu-
tionality of the remaining siting laws. 266
If the new California siting laws are permissible state controls over
nuclear power plants, they must not be construed as attempting to control
radiation hazards or as unreasonably interfering with the development of
nuclear power. 26 7 Therefore, it is necessary to examine each of these new
provisions to determine whether it would survive a constitutional challenge
based on federal preemption.
257. 42 U.S.C. §2021(k) (1970). See text accompanying notes 175-183 supra.
258. See Cavers, supra note 170, at 49.
259. See text accompanying notes 174-183 supra.
260. See text accompanying notes 233-239 supra.
261. See text accompanying notes 222-229 supra.
262. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25500-25542.
263. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3
264. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25524. 1(a), 25524.2, 25524.3.
265. See State, Dep't of Environ. Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J.
102, 112, 351 A.2d 337, 343 (1976).
266. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25500.
267. See text accompanying notes 142-261 supra.
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A. The Constitutional Validity of the Underground Siting and Berm
Containment Study
The requirement that the ERCDC complete a study of the undergrounding
and berm containment of reactors as a condition to new power plant
construction in the state268 raises the fewest questions concerning possible
federal preemption. This section only requires the ERCDC to inquire into
the "necessity, effectiveness, and economic feasibility of the underground-
ing and berm containment of reactors.' 2 6 9 While the legislation does not, of
itself, attempt to impose regulations that would require the underground
siting or berm containment of any reactors, it does imply that the ERCDC
may promulgate regulations or that the legislature may choose to implement
the findings of the study.2 70 The provisions of Section 25524.3, independent
of subsequent action by either the ERCDC or the legislature, will impose a
brief moratorium on the construction of new power plants until the study is
completed. 271 Stated in its most favorable light, this section imposes a brief
pause in power plant sitings while the state considers certain novel power
plant siting alternatives.
Although Section 25524.3 calls only for an inquiry into certain siting
alternatives, the ERCDC will be considering some radiation health and
safety questions. 272 Nevertheless, this factor alone would probably not be
decisive in finding preemption since a passive inquiry into certain radiation
health and safety questions is distinct from active regulation in the field. 273
Furthermore, the area of power plant siting has historically been reserved for
state regulation, 274 and since Section 25524.3 would not impose any regula-
tions that might interfere with a nuclear plant's federal operating license, the
ERCDC study should not suffer from the problems outlined by the New
York court in In re Consolidated Edison.275 Finally, it is unlikely that the
courts would find the provisions of Section 25524.3 an unreasonable inter-
ference with the private development of nuclear power since the new siting
law will probably not delay the start-up dates for new power plant construc-
tion.276 Thus, it appears that Section 25524.3 does not actively regulate
against radiation health and safety hazards or unreasonably interfere with the
private development of nuclear power. Consequently, Section 25524.3
would survive a constitutional challenge based on federal preemption.
268. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §25524.3. See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
269. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.3.
270. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
271. See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
272. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
273. See Joint Application of Wisconsin Power Co. et al., 5 ATOM. EN. 'L. REP. (CCH)
16,631.
274. See text accompanying notes 182-183 supra.
275. See text accompanying notes 209-212 supra.
276. See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
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B. The Constitutional Validity of the Reprocessing Provisions of the New
California Siting Legislation
Pursuant to Section 25524.1, future thermal nuclear power plants that
require the reprocessing of spent fuel will not be granted land use, or
certified by the ERCDC until the Energy Commission and the legislature are
satisfied that there is an identified and approved technology for the construc-
tion of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. 277 This new siting law also requires
a determination for each power plant being considered for siting that ade-
quate capacity either to reprocess or to store spent fuel is, or will be
available at the time such plants will need these services.278 These provi-
sions relating to the reprocessing and storing of spent nuclear fuel present
closer questions of preemption than do the provisions of Section 25524.3
relating to underground siting and berm containment of reactors. If the
reprocessing provisions are to survive a constitutional challenge of preemp-
tion they must not effect the regulation of radiation hazards from nuclear
power plants and must not unreasonably interfere with the private develop-
ment of atomic energy. 279
The reprocessing provisions of the new California siting legislation in-
volve principally economic considerations. As previously noted, the nuclear
power industry is currently facing a critical shortage of usable uranium, and
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is considered a vital link in the economic
viability of future nuclear power production. 280 Arguably, the legislature
considered some radiation health and safety issues, but these appear to be
secondary to the more significant economic issues related to reprocessing. 28'
The new siting provisions appear to manifest a decisi6n by the legislature
not to site power plants that depend on reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel
until such time as it can be demonstrated that such reactors are economically
justified. 282 Furthermore, the provision of Section 25524.1 that requires the
presence of adequate storage capacity for operational power plants283 ap-
pears to be motivated by economic considerations since a shortage of
storage capacity could result in the shutdown of reactors that will be needed
to meet future electric power demand. 2 4 Furthermore, it appears that even if
these provisions indirectly affect the radiation health and safety of nuclear
power plants, they could still survive a preemption challenge if they do not
interfere with a federal operating license2 85 and their purpose is to regulate
277. See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
278. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(b).
279. See text accompanying notes 141-261 supra.
230. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
281. See text accompanying notes 53-61 supra.
282. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1.
283. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(b).
284. See text accompanying notes 62-70 supra.
285. See text accompanying notes 241-261 supra.
1977 / Nuclear Power Siting
against non-radiological hazards of nuclear power plants.286 Thus, the provi-
sions of Section 25524.1 appear to be motivated by considerations distinct
from the protection against radiation hazards. Because the Atomic Energy
Act did not intend to preempt the states from regulating the activities of
federal licensees for the "manifold health, safety, and economic purposes
other than radiation protection," 287 a constitutional challenge of federal
preemption may be difficult to sustain. 288 However, if these economic
provisions will result in unreasonable interference with the federally stated
purpose of promoting the private development of atomic energy, this section
still may be constitutionally suspect.289
The provisions of Section 25524.1 could result in the exclusion of
particular types of nuclear reactors from the state. 2' Although there is no
precise test to measure the reasonableness of state exercise of non-radiation
control of nuclear power plants, there appears to be a persuasive argument in
support of a finding of reasonableness with respect to the provisions of
Section 25524.1. The California law does not discriminate against the
development of nuclear power per se. On the contrary, the California law is
a legislative declaration that certain reactor types are uneconomical in the
absence of reprocessing. 291 The legislature has assigned the ERCDC the
responsibility of determining whether there is a federally approved reproc-
essing technology. 292 Until the Energy Commission has made an affirmative
finding to that effect, the state has made the decision not to site nuclear
power plants that depend on the reprocessing of their spent nuclear fuel. 293
In the absence of the new siting provisions, the ERCDC inevitably would
weigh economic factors in the decision to site nuclear power plants in this
state. 294 Thus, the new law would, in the absence of an affirmative finding
by the ERCDC, exclude from that commission's consideration those reactor
types that the legislature has declared to be uneconomical. The conclusion
that Section 25524.1 is a reasonable exercise of state regulatory authority
finds some support in the literature on the subject. 295 Furthermore, it appears
that this conclusion is consistent with the California Supreme Court's
holding in Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and
Harbor since a siting decision based on reprocessing considerations would
286. See Cavers, supra note 170, at 51. The author argues that a state law which excluded
power plants from certain urban areas could be upheld under a preemption challenge even
though its motive was to prevent possible unsafe reactors near cities, since the protection of the
amenities of urban existence is a purpose distinct from protection against radiation hazards. Id.
287. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2872, 2882.
288. See Cavers, supra note 170, at 49.
289. See text accompanying notes 220-261 supra.
290. See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
291. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1.
292. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(a).
293. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §25524.1(a).
294. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
295. See Cavers, supra note 170, at 51.
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be made by the state prior to the issuance of a federal operating license and
would not involve regulation for protection against radiation hazards. 29
6
Therefore, since the reprocessing legislation is directed at nuclear power
problems distinct from the control of radiation health and safety hazards,
and involves a state balancing of economic and energy demand considera-
tions that does not appear to be unreasonable, a finding of federal preemp-
tion may be avoided.
It must be recognized, however, that no court has been required to
consider federal preemption of a statute similar to Section 25524.1. Whether
or not the courts will find preemption will depend largely on how the
Atomic Energy Act is construed. The leading preemption case involving
federal legislation similar to the Atomic Energy Act is First Iowa Hydro
Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,297 wherein the United
States Supreme Court found preemption based on the object and purpose of
the Federal Power Act.298 Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Act can be
distinguished from the Federal Power Act since the 1959 amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act contains a clear expression of congressional intent to
allow certain state regulations299 which is conspicuously absent in the
Federal Power Act. Thus, if the courts find the object and purpose of the
Atomic Energy Act to be superior to the provisions of the 1959 amendment,
then the reprocessing provisions of the California siting legislation still may
fall because of the rationale espoused in First Iowa.3°°
C. The Constitutional Validity of the Waste Disposal Provisions of the
New California Siting Legislation
The new waste disposal legislation30' presents the most difficult question
with respect to the issue of federal preemption. Couched in language similar
to the reprocessing law, it requires the ERCDC to determine whether there
exists an approved, permanent and terminal method of disposing of high-
level nuclear waste. 302 There are certainly some economic considerations
involved in waste disposal management questions, particularly those costs
associated with the solidification of liquid wastes. 30 3 Nevertheless, the
economic questions raised by waste disposal management problems are
secondary to the public health and safety issues. 3°4 Unlike the economic
issues presented by the lack of available reprocessing technology,305 it
296. See text accompanying notes 241-261 supra.
297. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
298. Id. at 164.
299. See 42 U.S.C. §2021(k) (1970).
300. See text accompanying notes 220-239 supra.
301. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
302. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §25524.2.
303. See [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) no.34, at 1236.
304. See text accompanying notes 71-100 supra.
305. See text accompanying notes 53-70 supra.
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appears unlikely that any nuclear power plant would be forced to shut down
because of a failure on the part of the federal government to develop quickly
a permanent and terminal method of disposing of high-level nuclear wastes.
Thus, the new California siting law appears to be a legislative recognition of
the potential public health and safety problems inherent in the production of
high-level nuclear wastes by nuclear power plants.
Under existing federal law the NRC is vested with the responsibility of
licensing and regulating "facilities used primarily for the receipt and storage
of high-level radioactive wastes . ... 306 The federal government has
expressly retained control over the disposal of nuclear wastes307 and corre-
sponding federal regulations subject high-level wastes to federal licensing
and control. 308 Pursuant to federal regulations, high-level nuclear wastes
must be transferred to a federal repository, at which time the federal
government takes title to them,30 9 and disposal of such wastes may proceed
only on federally owned and controlled land.310 Thus, it appears that the
federal government has manifested an intent to retain control over the
management of high-level nuclear wastes and there seems to be a strong
presumption in favor of finding the preemption of state controls in this field.
Although the California legislation is couched in land use terminology, 311
when determining its constitutionality the courts will most likely look to
whether the new provisions interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the
preempted areas of nuclear power regulation. 312 Since the California legisla-
tion appears to be addressing the public health and safety problems as-
sociated with high-level nuclear waste disposal, it may be difficult to argue
that the provisions of Section 25524.2 are distinguishable from regulations
that protect against radiation hazards. 313 This conclusion, coupled with the
clear congressional intent to retain federal control over high-level waste,
would support a finding of federal preemption. 314 The control of wastes
from nuclear power plants seems to fall within the category of regulation
intended to protect against the radiation hazards of atomic energy. Califor-
nia, by enacting Section 25524.2, is indirectly controlling the radiation
health and safety of nuclear power plants and such an indirect control would
appear to be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 315
Furthermore, it appears that the waste disposal provisions of the new
legislation would unreasonably interfere with the private development of
306. 42 U.S.C. §5842(3) (Supp. IV 1974).
307. 42 U.S.C. §2021(c)(4) (1970).
308. 10 C.F.R. §150.15(4), (5) (1977).
309. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. F(2) (1977).
310. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. F(3) (1977).
311. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§25524.1(a), 25524.2, 25524.3.
312. See State, Dep't of Environ. Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J.
102, 112, 351 A.2d 337, 343 (1976).
313. See text accompanying notes 71-85 supra.
314. See text accompanying notes 193-205 supra.
315. See 69 N.J. at 112, 351 A.2d at 343.
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nuclear power and thus, would be preempted. In Northern States, the
federal circuit court determined that the federal government is vested with
the responsibility of balancing the need for the private development of
nuclear power with the need to protect the public from the hazards of nuclear
by-products.3 16 Thus, it appears that the decision of whether nuclear power
plants should be constructed in the face of unresolved questions concerning
high-level nuclear waste disposal is one that Congress has reserved to the
federal government. 317 If the ERCDC or the legislature were to make
negative findings with respect to high-level waste disposal technologies, the
result would be the indefinite exclusion of all future nuclear power plants
from the state.318 This result would seem to frustrate the objectives of the
Atomic Energy Act and would frustrate the private development of nuclear
energy in the manner condemed by the federal court in Northern States.
Therefore, because the waste disposal legislation appears to regulate nuclear
power indirectly for protection against certain radiation health and safety
hazards and may be found to unreasonably frustrate the private develop-
ment of nuclear power, a finding of preemption would not be improbable.
CONCLUSION
Protection of the public health and safety is a paramount concern of all
states. Of no less importance to the states, is the manner of protection
afforded its residents from the possible harms associated with energy pro-
duction from nuclear power plants located within state boundaries. As a
policy decision, the California Legislature has expressed a deep concern for
the need to study various novel siting alternatives that might improve
protection of the public and it has recognized the problems associated with
the proliferation of nuclear power plants absent a thorough consideration of
nuclear fuel reprocessing and high-level radioactive waste disposal. Califor-
nia has recognized the need to resolve these problems before committing
future resources to nuclear power production. The federal government, on
the other hand, has recognized the problems associated with nuclear power
generation, but has committed this nation to atomic energy under the
preconceived notion that these problems will be resolved in the near future
without harm to the public health and safety. It is possible that this develop-
ing dependence on nuclear energy will be reversed under the new federal
administration. 319 Nevertheless, until there is a change in federal policies,
these nuclear power decisions may continue and could be shielded from
state scrutiny under the doctrine of federal preemption.
The federal courts have not completely resolved all the preemption
316. 447 F.2d at 1153-54.
317. See id.
318. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §25524.2.
319. See [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) no.169, at A-24.
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questions respecting atomic energy, but the depth of reasoning found in the
federal and state decisions, and the wealth of writings on the subject provide
valuable insight into the limits of state regulation in this field. Northern
States firmly stands as an obstacle to state attempts to regulate the radiation
hazards of nuclear power plants. Beyond the area of radiation health and
safety regulation, however, the acceptable bounds of state control are
undetermined. It does appear that legislatures must base state regulations on
considerations distinct from radiation protection if they are to avoid a
constitutional challenge of federal preemption.
In addition to drafting legislation directed toward distinctly non-
radiological problems of nuclear power plants, lawmakers must be alert to a
charge that the law unreasonably interferes with the object and purpose of
the Atomic Energy Act-to promote the private development of atomic
energy. Legislation that treats all forms of power production in a like
manner and does not discriminate against atomic energy per se should be
preferred. Furthermore, a statute that purports to exclude all nuclear power
plants from the state may be difficult to defend against a preemption
challenge. It is probable that the only state laws which will be upheld are
those that strike a reasonable balance betweei the exercise of control over
non-radiation health and safety, economics, and the federally-stated objec-
tive of promoting the private development of nuclear energy. Finally, state
statutes that are directed toward controlling radiation hazards of power
plants, such as the discharge of nuclear wastes, will probably not be saved
because they are couched in land use terminology. If a statute indirectly
invades the preempted field, the courts will probably not hesitate to find it
unconstitutional.
The new California siting provisions appear, in part, to be a valid exercise
of state regulatory authority in the field of nuclear power. The underground
siting and berm containment study, since it does not actively regulate
nuclear power plants, presents little threat of a preemption challenge.
Furthermore, the reprocessing legislation appears to be considering the
economic problems that are distinct from radiation hazards of nuclear power
plants. The fact that the reprocessing provisions do not invade the pre-
empted field should raise a presumption respecting their validity. Addition-
ally, since the provisions only apply to those power plants that require the
reprocessing of nuclear fuel and do not discriminate against nuclear power
per se, it appears that a strong argument can be presented to support its
validity. The state should be able to argue that it has struck a reasonable
balance between its right to consider the economic viability of certain types
of nuclear power plants and the federally-stated objective of promoting
private nuclear development. The high-level waste disposal provisions of
the new legislation will -face the most difficult challenge under a preemption
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attack. Not only does the new law indirectly invade the preempted field of
nuclear waste management, it would result in the exclusion of all nuclear
power plants from the state if there is a negative finding by either the
ERCDC or the legislature regarding waste disposal technologies. Under the
emerging principles of federal preemption, the waste disposal provisions of
the new California siting legislation may be open to a constitutional
challenge.
John Rohan Brydon
